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AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF COAL MINE TAXATION IN UTAH
INTRODUCTION
A discussion of the subject of coal mine taxation seems
timely and should be of much practical interest in view of
the present depressed condition in which the coal industry
finds itself.

Coal production has developed into one of

Utah's most important industries from the standpoint of quantity, value, and associated employment.

It has become vital

to the economic stability and security of the state.

Coal

producers, however, have encountered serious economic ditficulties during the past two decades.

The task of building

up profitable industrial activities is one thing, the job of
protecting and maintaining them is another matter.
Not only has the industry failed to continue the progress of the War and pre-War period, but it has lost much
of the market which had been developed.

Shrinking demand,

decreasing production, rising costs and falling prices have
practically wiped out prof1ts. 1 Laborers and their families,
people who have depended on the coal industry tor their prosperity and existence tor years, have found themselves unemployed and without incomes.

The productive capacity of mines

1 On each ton of coal produced in the United States in 1936,
the producer lost 11 cents.

Time, December 27, 1937.

A combined deficit of approximately $2,500,000 was incurred

by Utah mining companies during the few years preceding
1936. Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,
An Economic Study~ the Development 2! Utah's Coal Industry,
P• 51.
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has been more than double the consumption needs of this
area.

Consequently, a considerable portion of the 40 million dollars 2 which bas been invested in coal mining equip-

ment has become a millstone on the neck of the industry.
Indeed, coal has become news--labor news, price news, bankruptcy news.
But because the coal industry is threatened with economic
chaos, it must not be assumed that its tax is at fault.
coal problem is national in scope.

The

The people ot Utah can-

not hope to uncover a panacea applicable to this state alone.
Utah long sinoe ceased to be a separate and distinct economic
unit.

Those economic and political factors that attect in-

dustries in other states, likewise tend to exert a similar
influence upon corresponding industries in this state.
Notwithstanding this tact, ooal taxes amount to a considerable portion of the cost of operations.

They undoubted-

ly have a significant influence on the economic status ot
the industry.

Mine operators contend that the present tax is

both excessive and discriminatory, but this claim is not
unnatural.

Bo taxpayer ever denies that he ought to pay his

tair share or the expenses ot government; what he loudly and
sometimes violently asserts is that the tax imposed on h1m
is more than his tair share, while other people ottentimes
are equally torcetul in asserting that what he pays is less
than his tair share.

What makes the contention of the oper-

ators significant, however, is the tact that the whole trend
2

Salt ~ Tribune, January 30, 1938, p. 52.
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o£ mining activity has changed since the tax was adopted
in 1919.

The mine owners point out that all of the factors

which were weighted heaviest in originally determining tonvalues have changed to such an extent that they are not
applicable now.

On the basis of these changes, the mining

companies have appealed for tax reductions, and they -have
also requested that tax discriminations between

co~eting

fuels be eliminated.
How much justification there is to these claims and
appeals is not known.

A detailed study of the problem has

not been made, although economic conditions give it sufficient importance to justify some serious consideration.
Coal production is too important to the welfare of Utah to
have its problema ignored.

If tax injustices are contrib-

uting to the economic distress of the coal industry, action
should be promptly taken to remedy the situation.

On the

otber band, if the tax levied on coal mining property is not
unjust, the loud and earnest assertions ot the coal operators could be dismissed with the comforting assurance that
coal mines are being fairly treated.
However, the fact must not be ignored that each tax is
a regulatory tax.

A pure tax (one that produces revenue

without in any way altering the economic order) is an ideal

ot fiscal theorists.

No tax has yet been devised that does

not in itae1t result in minor or major economic changes.
Whenever a tax on business, consumption, or property is not
truly general and uniform, it discriminates between economic

- 4 -

elements, and modifies the economic order.

A gasoline tax

which adds tour or five cents to the price of motor fuel
has a repressive ettect on the oil industry.

A heavy fixed-

sum licenae tax on a class ot retail stores may force some
stores out ot business altogether and may bring profits to
others in excess ot the tax they pay.

Likewise, a tax on

coal which adds several cents to the cost ot producing each
ton may reduce coal production and stimulate demand for
other products.

It the tax on all property is not uniform

in its ettect, some property is being given preferential
treatment and other property is being handicapped by
discrimination.
Since taxes can make a fairly profitable mine worthless
and a very profitable mine worth less than it was before,
the problem ot analyzing the effect ot coal mine taxes on
the industry under present economic conditions seema appropriate.

In this study we shall "look and see" what has

actually happened to the ad valorem property tax which was
imposed on the Utah coal industry 22 years ago.

The indus-

try has been in motion, changes have taken place; but, what
about its taxT
Although there are other interesting coal mine taxes,
we can do little more than recognize them in this study.

In

analyzing the property tax, our investigation will be limited
to the following tive topics:

(1) the method employed in

taXing Utah coal mines; (2) the economic characteristics of
the industry; (3) the effect of economic changes on the tax

- 5 -

burden; (4) the regulatory aspects of the tax; and (5) some
comparisons of tax uniformity.
It would be more than one might expect, that such
inquiries could be answered in absolute terms.

In economic

analysis it is seldom possible to arrive at more than tendencies and approximations.

Even these points, if analyzed

completely, could result in a voluminous report.

The data

contained in this study, therefore, will be carefully
selected and tersely stated.

- 6 -

TAXATION PROCEDURE FOR UTAH COAL MINES
The taxation of mines is perhaps the moat difficult
problem to solve to the satisfaction ot all concerned in
the whole field of taxation.

Hot only is it a subject of

continual discussion in

but the experience in this

Ut~,

state seems to be no different from that of many other states
where mining is ot considerable importance.

'l'his continu-

ous discussion arises partly trom certain peculiar features

ot the industry, and partly from the tact that mines are
usually given special tax treatment.

It is difficult to

tit mine taxation into any system of general business taxation.

Producing mineral properties differ from other prop-

erties in that their value suffers continuous depletion as
the mineral deposits on which that value is based are removed from the earth.

Mineral wealth, for this reason, is

usually classified separately for taxation purposes in most
states.
Types

2! !!e! taxation. Some states have exercised

considerable originality in formulating methods ot taxing
mines, but a few standard types stand out.
employ the ad valorem system of taxation.

A number of states
This procedure

requires that an assessed value be placed on the property of
each mining company, including the mineral deposits, in the
same manner that a public utility or a farm is assessed.

To

this assessment the local and state mill rates are applied
to determine the taxes to be paid.
mine taxes on net proceeds.

Some ot the states base

Other states determine their

- 7 mineral taxes from gross proceeds, while an increasing number
are applying some type ot severance tax either in lieu of
other tax methods or as a supplement to other forms.
Assessment of

~

coal mines. · Utah adopted the ad

valorem method of assessing coal mines in 1919.

Prior to

that time, they were taxed on the same basis as other mining
property.

In addition to an ad valorem assessment on surface

rights, improvements, and equipment, a tax was levied on the
net proceeds of mining operations.

In 1919, however, the

Legislature of Utah provided for taxation of coal deposits
according to a given formula to be used in arriving at assessed valuation.

The surface taxes and the ad valorem as-

sessment on machinery and equipment were maintained.
Assessment Eroblems.

The task of assessing coal mines

was delegated to the State Board of Equalization and
Assessment.

This commission was no small assignment, since

the taxation of mines presents many problems that require
special treatment.

Any careful study of taxation will reveal

that tne problem of just and satisfactory assessments is an
extremely difficult one, but it is generally admitted that
its application to mines presents difficulties that may not
be present in other types of enterprises.

In the case of land,

yields over a period of years will ordinarily demonstrate
economic factors involved in production.

Pbr public utilities,

factories, and machinery, facts relative to costs of construction are usually available.

These provide at least a foun-

dation for placing tax estimates on this type of property.
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The problems involved in assessing mineral deposits for ad
valorem taxation are much more complicated.
In the first place, a sound base on which to levy the
tax had to be determined.
at occasional outcrops.

Coal appears on the surface only
The great body of the resource is

completely bidden from sight.

Yet, it coal is to serve as

a tax base, the extent of the deposits should be readily
ascertainable.

In order to provide this information, an

extensive survey was required.

In conformance with the Act

of 1919, all coal land was divided into 40-acre tracts.
Bach of these legal subdivisions was a unit ot assessment,
and the report of the survey of each included data on the
number of seams the property contained, the thickness and
relative position of each seam, and the available tonnage.
Some tests of quality were also requisite to the fair
assessment of coal deposits.

This problem was not difficult

where the coal beds were uniform in thickness and substance.
In Utah, however, there were several varieties of coal, and
the value of each was different.

It was important, there-

tore, that the description of each property included some
data on the ash, water, sulphur, and fixed carbon content
of the eoal.
Naturally, these were no problems for a county assessor;
they were a

rea~

challenge for trained technicians.

Some

states have not taken this tact into consideration, and
consequently they have been experiencing difficulty with the
ad valorem method.

In Utah the complete geological survey
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was made in the beginning.

About two years were required

to complete this work; but when the final reports were filed
with the State Board of Equalization, a comprehensive record
covering actual measurements of more than 100 billion tons
of Utah coal was available as a base for assessment.l
Undoubtedly much of the success which Utah bas had with the
ad valorem method can be attributed to this fact.
After the actual tonnage of each 40-acre tract bad
been computed, it next became the object of the survey to
decide upon a fair ton-value for the coal.

This ton-value

was to be the deciding factor on land values; and it was
desired to fix a price which would be consistent in maintaining a fairness to the property holders and at the same
time guarantee a fair return to the state.

In keeping with

this policy, several meetings were held by the Board, with
representatives from practically all the operating and nonoperating coal property holders in the state in attendance.
The result of these conferences was the adoption of a schedule which divided the coal land or Utah into nine classes
and fixed ton-values for each.
In classifying and valuing coal property, several

difficult problems in mineral economics had to be solved.
These were just as technical as those which faced the geologists, and their solution was just as important in making
possible a satisfactory taxing procedure.
For most types of property the entire amount is utilized
1

State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Thirteenth
Biennial Report, p. 14.

- 10 in production, but only a part of mineral deposits can ever
be utilized in production at one time.

The tar.mer culti-

vates all his land, and the whole area is therefore assessed.
With a mine it is different; that part which cannot possibly
be reached for ten years is in quite a different status from
the coal lying a toot ahead of the working face.
in reserve have a deferred value.
to be a rather

d~ubtful

value.

Minerals

Frequently this turns out

If the coal that can be mined

this year has a present worth of $100,000, an identical
quantity which cannot be mined for ten years has a value of
$62,000, if the rate of interest is 5 percent, and the price

remains the same.

Coal which will not be mined for many

years has a small present value.
If the tax is based on an annual production rate of
4,500,000 tons, and the output falls to three million tons
per year; coal that would have been extracted ten years
hence will have to wait 15 years for production.
does this increase the tax which each of the three

Not only
~llion

tons of coal will be required to carry, but it also extends
the time that the current production will have to assume this
increased load.

Ttme and extraction data were significant,

therefore, in determining the value of coal for taxation
purposes.
Ascertaining the percentage of taxable coal in each
property was another problem which occupied the attention
of the Board.

In the process of mining it is 1mpossible to

extract 100 percent of the coal in each seam.

Various
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factors are responsible tor this situation.

But inasmuch

as it is practical to recover actually only a certain percentage of a deposit, determining a fair percentage that
could be uniformly applied to all mines required some thought.
Bqualizing the tax burden was a twofold problem which
the Board was required to solve.

It demanded not only tbat

some attention be paid to uniformity among industries, but
that the Board also consider uniformity between different
types of coal mines.

Large quanti ties of land in Utah were

retained as a possession of the federal government, and many
companies were producing considerable amounts of coal on
this federal land.

These companies were not required to pay

taxes, but they paid a royalty or ten cents on each ton of
coal they mined.

In adopting a tax tor privately owned

companies, therefore, some equitable provision was necessary which would place the company that pays taxes on large
land holdings somewhat on the same basis as the company that
operates under a lease contract.

Bence, it was intended

that the system ot assessing coal mines "should yield a tax
which would approximate ten cents per ton ot coal mined." 2
T.bis tax load also approXimated the loads borne by other
industries. 3
~

schedule adopted.

Bach of these problems was

carefully studied before the first schedule of assessment
classes and values appeared.

Past production and the

2 Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,
.Q.P.• ill•, P• 45.
3

~·,

passim.

- 12 facilities and possibilities of future extraction were
considered in detail.

Interest rates, extraction costs,

market values, and much other economic data were also controlling elements in determining per-ton values.

The prob-

lem of weighting each of these factors in such a manner as
to work out a just and satisfactory tax was the primary
objective of the Board at all times.
In the original schedule the class values varied with
the distance from a component part of a mine, a coal outcrop, or a railroad according to the theory that the most
accessible coal would be mined first.

Tne coal in those 40-

acre tracts which were being operated on a railroad was given
the highest value. 4 In the first schedule this value was
three cents per ton, and it was designated as class

"A"

coal.

Land which was not being operated but which lay one mile on
either side of a 40-acre tract that was being operated was
claseified as
two cents.

"B"

land.

It was assigned a per-ton value of

The first schedule also contained seven other

classifications, each somewhat less desirable than

•sn

land, and each with

a

•A"

and

smaller per-ton value.

In 1919, when these values were worked out, it was
estimated that a 6-to 12-year supply of class
another 15-to 25-year supply of class
assessed against the operators.5

"B"

"A"

coal and

coal were being

The assessment of the other

classes added considerably to the assessable supply, but
4
5

FOr the complete schedule of original classes and values
see the Twelfth Biennial Report of the State Board of
Equalization.
Investigating Co~ttee of Utah Governmental Units,
22• cit., p. 46.
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the rates were very low on most of these classes.

The

problem of dererred values, therefore, was considered and
an effort was made to assess most highly that coal which
would be mined first.

The per-ton values that were assigned

to each class were intended to be sufficiently high, when
combined with the levy on capital equipment, to exact a tax
on the representative coal company that would approach uniformity with other industries.

The time required to extract

each class of coal and the production rate of 1919 were,
therefore, both weighted heavily in the original calculations.
Provision was also made for the assessment of 63 per-

.....
...... ........
......
..... . .• .•
cent was considered a legitimate waste. Coal extracted in
.....
.·:........ ...
excess of this percentage was tax free. In a subsequent
section we shall consider added advantages of the 63 percent. 7····
··:·:
.... .:..
cent of the actual coal property.6

The remaining 27 per-

·.· ~

Applying ~ ~·

Each ton of coal that it was practical···:: ::·

to extract in each legal subdivision was to be assessed until
it was mined out.

The actual production was deducted from

the assessable tonnage as a depletion allowance.

The tax ··

cost of all the coal to which an operator had title became a
cost of his current production.
If an operator owned land lying in several different
classes, his tax was calculated by multiplying the amount
of coal which 1t was practical to extract in each 40-acre
tract by the per-ton value of the appropriate class.

For

instance, if a producer owned land containing one million
6

7

Ibid., p. 49.
See P• 71.

83209

.....

- 14 tons of assessable class "A" coal and two million tons of
class "B" coal, his tax base was determined by multiplying
one million tons by three cents per ton and two million tons
by two cents per ton. 8 The sum of these two products was
the base to which the local and state mill rates were applied
to determine the amount of his tax.
Ch!nges !a the schedule.

The procedure adopted in 1919

has been modified only slightly, but the ton-values and
classes have undergone some fundamental changes.

Apparently,

the original schedule undertaxed coal mines as compared with
other industries because a revised schedule was worked out
after two years experience with the first list of classes
and values. 9 The principal changes in the 1921 schedule
consisted of adding two more classes, and in raising the
per-ton value ot class "A" coal from three cents per ton to
four cents per ton, and class "B" coal from two cents to
two and a half cents per ton.

Some property was also written

ott the assessment rolls because the coal was not recoverable, and in a few cases tonnage estimates were revised to
compensate for faulting and other variations which were not
ascertained in the original survey.

Bach year's develop-

ments in any coal mine revealed new features.

The seams

could be thicker or thinner than was expected, wants were
discovered, and coal quality was not always uniform.

Pro-

vision was made, therefore, for adjustments in the valuation
8
9

This statement is based on the original schedule of values.
For the complete table of classes and values adopted in
1921 see the Thirteenth Biennial Report of the State Board
of Bqualization and Assessment.
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on the annual developments as well as the computation made
in the earlier survey.
In carrying out these provisions, the Board was handicapped somewhat by lack of tunds. 10 Ho appropriations were
made to the department tor checking up on developments which

Demands tor adjust-

took place after the survey was made.

ments which favored the companies were brought to the Board,
but in many instances coal properties were worked to greater
depths than was anticipated.

However, no funds were available to employ an expert to check on these developments. 11
The occasional adjustments, therefore, had the effect or
reducing the assessable tonnage, although there were many
cases in which tonnage estimates or coal could have been
materially increased.
The 1921 schedule was the basis of

asses~ent

until

1933 when a flat reduction or 10 percent on the values of
all classes or coal land below class

"A"

was adopted.

This

change was juatitied in view of the depressed economic condition of the industry.
It was estimated in 1936 12 that there was enough class
"A" coal in Carbon and Bmery Counties alone to supply four
million tons of coal per year for 12 years.
basis the class

1

Upon this same

A" and class 1 B" coal combined would supply

production for 46 years.

Continuing on this same basis,

State Board ot Equalization and Assessment, Fifteenth
Biennial Report, p. 11.
11 At present this is part of the job or coal mine inspector.
12 Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,
22• cit., P• 10.

lO
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the coal assessed in these two counties would supply the
demand for 110 years.

In addition to the enormous reserve

in these two counties, 15 other Utah counties contain workable deposits.

Many properties in these counties are also

on the assessment rolls.
Much criticism of the present procedure is based on the
tact that it assessed coal land so far removed trom production.

A considerable reserve of coal land increases the tax

cost per ton of coal mined by a substantial amount.

Engineers

ot the United States Treasury Department limit deferred
values to a period of approximately 40 years.l 3

In Utah,

classes "A" and "B" coal are not limited to that extent.

The

aim ot the Board of Equalization, however, was to place values
on all classes ot coal land that would yield a tax payment
which would approximate ten cents per ton of coal mined for
the representative mine.

It.

re~enue

had been the only con-

sideration, values could have been placed on class "A" coal
alone that were sufficiently high to yield the desired tax,
and at the same time save considerable accounting expense.
It is doubtful that raising a certain amount ot revenue was
the only factor considered in taxing mineral wealth on an
ad valorem basis. 14 Other advantages of taxing all privately
owned land at some value recommend its maintenance.
In 1936 the State Tax Commission15 did make some eoncessions to the operators.
13
14
15

A new schedule was adopted

Findlay, J. R. "The Future Value of Mineral Property,"
Brookings Lectures, p. 286.
See p. 72.
The State Tax Commission succeeded the State Board of
Equalization and Assessment in 1931.
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containing only tour classes of coal land, and providing
for lower assessment values on those properties that will
not be mined for 40 or 50 years.

On some classes reduction

in ton-values amounted to as much as one cent per ton.

Each

40-acre tract containing a truck mine was also removed from
the regular classification.

Provision was made for their

annual assessment by the State Tax Commission.

These changes

unquestionably reduced the assessed values of many properties
by a considerable amount.
table 1.

This new schedule is presented in

It is still the basis of Utah coal mine assessments.

Assessment of machinery and equipment.

So far in this

section we have been discussing the assessment of coal land,
and have barely mentioned that an ad valorem assessment on
capital equipment is also a part of the present procedure of
taxing coal mines.

The reason is obvious; the special prob-

lem in assessing mines on an ad valorem basis is valuing the
mineral deposits.

Machinery and equipment are assessed on

the same basis as capital improvements in any industry.

The

problem which equipment assessments in the coal industry
presents is not one of valuation so much as one of amount.
Approximately 44 percent of the total tax paid by the mines
during the years 1925 to 1935 was based on the assessed
values of capital equipment.l6 It is doubtful that this
burden has been reduced in view of the over-capitalized
condition of the industry.

This problem will be more

completely discussed in the next section.

l6

Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,
22• cit., p. 62.

- 18 Table 1.
Class

Method of assessing coal for taxation under
rates effective 1936*
Description
Ton Value

A Land now operating on the railroad in 40-acre
tracts will be considered as "operating" and in
class A which are penetrated by a component part
· or the workings of an operating mine on the same
bed regardless of whether actual production is
now being made from the 40 ••••••••••••••••••••••

4.0¢

B Land on railroad adjacent to mines now operating
within two miles of coal outcrop and one mile on
each side of 40-acre tracts being operated ••••••

2.25¢

C Land adjacent to class B but which lies from two
to four miles from coal outcrop, and land requiring less than five miles of railroad, and
included within two miles from coal outcrop •••••

0.5¢

D All lands not included in class A, B, or C,
except 40-acre tracts containing truck mines ••••

0.07¢

Emery, Sevier, Sanpete, and Carbon Counties
to be classified and assessed upon this basis.
Summit County class A to be appraised at 2.0¢
per ton, class B at 1.19¢ per ton, class C at
0.5¢ per ton. Assessments to apply only one
mile back from outcrop.
Grand County to be valued on the same basis
as Carbon County except class A at the rate of
2.0¢ per ton, class B at 1.19¢ per ton.
Iron County to be valued at a nominal rate
per acre and to be assessed only one mile back from
outcrop.
Each 40-acre tract containing a truck mine
to be appraised annually by the State Tax Commission.
*source:

Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,
"An Economic Study of the Development of Utah's
Coal Resources," p. 48.
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ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF UTAH'S COAL INDUSTRY
At the time the ad valorem method of taxing coal
property was adopted it was no doubt as fair a basis of
taxation as any that could have been devised under conditions then prevailing.

An

effort was made to work out a

scientific formula that would result in fair assessment
values and a burden equal to those imposed on other industries.

The program required many technical processes

and much careful study; but after the plan had been completed, the consensus of expert opinion seemed to be that
a fair tax base had been adopted.
If we assume that the procedure did originally result
in fair assessments, it does not follow that the same would
be true now.

Even a scientific formula may prove unsound.

Strictly speaking, it is only applicable as long as the
original facts remain unchanged, unless the changes that
have been made in the assessment schedule have kept up with
industrial changes.

Dynamic industrial processes do not

long conform to rigid rules.

The problem, therefore, of

determining what industrial changes have taken place since
1919, seems important.

With this information, we can analyze

the effect of the present tax on the present coal industry.
Major economic problems.

In recent years there have

been a number of great disturbing factors tending to upset
.the equilibrium of the coal industry in general.

These

factors seem to group themselves into two seta of economic
forces, each of which is responsible in part for the

- 20 instability of the industry:

(1) those influences that

resulted in capital expansion, and (2) those factors that
were responsible for production curtailment.

Since these

forces have had a joint effect on the coal industry, it is
difficult to determine which has been more significant in
creating the problems which face the industry at the present
time.

Bach, however, has exerted a significant influence

in transforming coal production from an industry composed
of a prosperous group of expanding enterprises in 1919, into
one that is confronted with serious economic problems in 1941.
The situation in which the Utah coal industry now finds
itself is graphically presented in figure 1.

This diagram

shows the annual Utah coal production, the five-year average,
and the trend of expansion that ended in 1920.

The broken

projection line shows the tremendous gap between expected
production as of that time, and the actual present figures. 1
This figure presents the problem rather clearly, but
the actual causes of the disparity between capital expansion
and coal production are worth discussing.

Many of them are

extremely important -in analyzing the tax on coal.
Causes~

Q!!t-opttmism.

Capital EePansion

Industries as well as people grow from

youth to maturity, but the industrial process is seldom
recognized.
1

Consequently, economic difficulties usually

The straight-line projection of expected production is
fitted to the rising production trend which preceded
1920. No claims are made fo~ its accuracy. It merely
projects a trend.
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Appendix A

There is a 1tmit to the use that mankind can make

of any thing; and when it is supplied up to that limit,
there is bound to be a turning point in demand.

Coal pro-

duction in Utah made phenomenal increases between 1870,
when 5,800 tons were extracted,2 and the peak year of 1920,
when more than six million tons were produced.
2

Probably the

No coal production data were kept prior to l870, although
a mine within 40 miles of Salt Lake City began operations
in 1863. The fact that the first Utah coal was shipped
by rail in 1870 also makes this year _significant.
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most significant factor giving impetus to this expansion
was the average increase in consumption per person during
the period.

For the nation as a whole, per capita con-

sumption multiplied 28 times between 1850 and 1915. 3

It

seems logical to conclude that this same trend was largely
responsible for the expansion of Utah mines.
During the period of growth the market for Utah coal
was also becoming broader and more profitable.

Tbe demand

created by this factor stimulated production.

Coal began to

roll in an almost steady stream from the Utah mines to the
markets in the western states.

The market expanded from

British Columbia to Mexico and from the Pacific Coast to the
Missouri River.

Not only were mines stepping up operations

to the extent that each individual could increase his consumption of coal, but more and more was being shipped over
the rapidly expanding railroad system to supply an export
market.

Approx±mately 45 percent ot Utah's coal production

is consumed outside the state.
Population growth also had some influence on demand.
Between 18?0 and 1920 Utah's population increased 5.2 times.
The demand created by this factor alone is sufficient to
increase production more than five times it consumption per
person had not changed from the 18?0 average.

However, the

influence of population growth seems negligible as compared
with the other two factors.
The combined effect ot these factors, and possibly many
3

Findlay,

.2R_.

ill• , p.

285.

- 23 others which have not been discussed, resulted in a 1920
production that was 1,035 times as great as the production
of 18?0.

This phenomenal growth can be explained in terms

of increasing demand, but it does not take a mathematical
genius to perceive that this progression could not go on
indefinitely.

But during a period of growth people cannot

think that a change is mathematically certain.

Growth

becomes a part of the established order of things.

If a

process bas promise of going on just a few more years,
people invest 1n it as if it were going on forever.
equipment installations outrun production needs.

Capital

The enter-

priser wants to be prepared for the anticipated demand increase.

When this new demand fails to materialize as it did

in the coal industry, the mines are left to bear the fixed
costs of more equipment than they need.

Disturbing economic

problems result.

-The

--

abundance of coal.

Another of the chief causes of

capital expansion in the coal industry is the fact that there
is so much coal; and that it can be developed in so many
places at comparatively small cost, and with little experience.

One-fifth of the state of Utah is underlain with

bituminous coal.

More than 196 billion tons of workable

coal is distributed among 1? Utah counties.4

Many of the

beds are thick and consistent, making mining operations
relatively inexpensive.

In

many places tempting outcrops

can be plainly seen where a small expenditure can develop a
4

United States Geological Survey.
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This condition as munh as anything else is responsible
tor the fact that Utah now has 94 coal companies 5 equipped
to produce tor a market which the four largest companies
could easily supply.6
ating, however.

Not all of these companies are oper-

A number are now submarginal units which

have temporarily been withdrawn from production.
omic

If econ-

are favorable to production, they may again
start operations. In 1939, 58 mines reported production. 7
conditio~

These 58 companies produced an average of 49,086 tons,
although 65.6 percent of the coal produced by these oper'

ators came from 15.5 percent of the mines.
Seasonal demand.

The effect of seasonal demand on

production facilities is also important.

Much of the equip-

ment that is productive in one season is excess capacity in
another.

Because ot the absence of sufficient storage to

level out seasonal demand, the mines must at all times be
ready to ship what is wanted.

In many sections of the country

coal production evidences no seasonal variations worthy of
note.

Approximately 88 percent of the production of the
United States is used for industrial activities. 8 While
these activities do slow up a bit in the summer months, it
is not enough to show any marked seasonal slump.
The real seasonal fluctuations take place in those areas
5 Bituminous Coal Commission, Schedule of Effective
Minimum Prices, p. 4.
-6 Inv~stigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,
~· cit., p. 23.
7 Minera!s Yearbook, 1940.
8 Breyer, Commodity Marketing, (An estimate).
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where domesti c fuel
splendid example .

l arge in the market .

Utah is a

Only 26 percent of the coal conoumod in

Utah goes to i ndustry . 9

remaining 74 percent is used

Tho

for heating homes, apartments , and other dwellings .
Ut~'s

not be doubted that the seasonal nature of

It can-

coal pro-

duction is a powerful incentive to over-capitalization in
A compariso~ between the seasonal

the coal industry .

variations of Ut ah 1 s coal production and United States• coal
production is shovm by t he accompanying indices of seasonal
f luctuation.
Index
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I t may be not ed f r om figure 2 that during s ome months
of t he year t he demand f or coal in Utah reaches abnormal
heights, whj.le at o ther times the demand falls to a very
9

B. P. Manley , Secret a r y of t he Ut ah Coal Oper ators • Assn.
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low mark.

The production of November, December, January,

and February almost equals that of the other eight months.
Monthly variations in production for the United States are
much less extreme.
Other factors.

The World War boom resulted in some

over-capacity in the coal mining industry also.

Largely

due to governmental insistence, for which there was no real
need, many new mines were opened up. 10 They have since
added nothing to the

economi~

welfare of the state, but

have diluted the market for the more firmly

establis~ed

companies .•
Of importance also wer·e some promotional schemes.
Since the industry had offered good returns for quite a long
period, there seemed to be no reason why these returns should
not continue for a period of unlimited duration.

Clever

promoters took advantage of this situation and endeavored
to have costly installations revert to them after they had
frozen out the stockholders.

some cases of over-development

can undoubtedly be attributed to these schemes.
Result.

All of these factors have combined to develop

what some have chosen to call "the worst functioning industry
in ex1stence.nll
ever needed.

More mines have been opened up than were

More machinery and equipment has been installed

than has ever been used.

Each privately owned tract of coal

land is taxable regardless of its rate of output.

~ch

machine and building, each foot of rail and each tie upon
10
11

Eavenson, 2£!! Through~ Ages, p. 87.
Jensen, Government Finance, p. 124.
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which the track is layed, is assessable whether it is
excess capacity or part of an operating unit.

The tax on

productive deposits and reserve deposits, on operating
equipment and excess equipment, are all costs of each ton
of coal mined.

It is reasonable to conclude, therefore,

that the more tons of coal this total tax cost is spread
over, the smaller will be the tax per ton.
Figure 3 illustrates the extent of over-capitalization
for the years 1915 to 1940.

The production line shows the

actual output of Utah mines during the average number of
days that the mines were operating each year.

The full-

capacity line gives us an idea of how much coal Utah mines
could have produced if they had used their facilities for
308 days each year instead of the fewer number of days that
the mines actually operated.

The 260-day line illustrates

the extent production could have been increased if Utah
mines had operated five days per week throughout the year.
Figure 3 clearly shows that the coal mines of Utah have
been capitalized beyond production needs.

The average per-

cent of excess productive capacity for this 26-year period
amounts to 64.3 percent, assuming a full-time capacity based
on a 308-day year.

Or if we assume a production average of

five days per week, the percent of excess capacity still
averages more than 39 percent each year.

This figure also

shows a full time excess capacity which, stated in percentages, ranges all the way from 19 percent to more than 10?
percent.

In 1940, the latest year for which we have a report,
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the excess capacity amounted to more than 75 percent.
It seems probable, however, that figure 3 actually
understates the extent of over-capitalization in the industry.

It takes into consideration only those mines that

are actually producing, while 1n reality there are many small
submarginal mines that are equipped for production which now
are wholly inactive, or else are supplying little more than
the owner's fuel; and yet, if economic conditions improved,
they would become significant producers.

Ine.tf1c1eno1es

resulting from small labor forces likewise are not taken

- 29 ...

into account.
9~te

Bowever~

production per man-day

,conclusively that' when a

~ne

~tud1es

prove

app,roaches optimum

the amount ot coal whioh eaoh man produces p~~ day
increases b7 a oonsiderable amount. 12 It seems lOSicalto
oa~ac1 t7

conclude that even these two factors would appreciably
increase·production, in some,.ears at least, beyond 'the
potential output, 11lustrated1n the

a~ove dlag~am ff1~ure.,3).

The thought must· .not be accepted, however, . that overcapitalization is a phenomenon of the last tew 7ears.
in the prosperous 7ears ot 1919 and 1920 excess
excee~ed ~c~ual

subs~q~ent 78&1'8

5~_perc~nt

duotlon.

needs by

appro~ate17

ot the decade

greater than were

!Wen

c~pac1t7

25 percent.

in the,

cap1talt~c11ities we~e

~ctual1y nec~ssarr

tul17

tor pro-

As. long as the demand for coal was not seriously

threatel'led, the lndustrl

c~ul~

afford. some excess

c~pac1t1.

Tax costs were not burdensome, nor were other costs, until
-

,

production
began to tall prec1pitous11--and prices, also.
.
'

Then, with small returns and high fixed costs,

lnolu.~ni

tax coats, the lndustrr felt itself in economic pertl.

AmonS those faotors wh1ch reduced demand for coal were some
that appeared to have a permanent eftect.

Factors Responsible for Production Curtailment

'lB!! economy. Perhaps tne most important factor ltm1t-

ins

the expaD810n of ,bituminous coal consumption was the

. remarkable increase ot the thermal stilcl.nc,. ot plants

12 Investlgat1ngOommlttee of Utah Governmental
,22- .2!-!., pp. 1'1 and ac.

~Dlts,
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using coal.
~s

Some data on this trend are given in table 2.

efficiency trend began during the World War period

when coal prices were high.

It resulted in an extensive and

exhaustive research in which commercial and industrial consumers found

~ays

and less coal.

ot doing the same amount of work with less

This meant a cumulative saving to large

coal users of millions of tons, but the coal industry suffered

to the extent of these savings.

Competing sources .2! energy.

'l'he coal indus try is

confronted with a number of strong competitors.

It must

openly compete with the oil, natural gas, and water power
industries.

It it cannot meet this competition success-

tully, then it will be gradually replaced by the other forms
of energy.

A "survival of the fittest" struggle has been

going on for sometime with the result that the coal industry
has had to give some ground.
Wbile coal bas been losing customers, natural gas and
oil have been showing noticeable increases.

Lack of suffi-

cient data prevents a percentage breakdown of fuel consumption in Utah.

'

However, the trend of consumption for all

tuels in the United States is graphically depleted in
figure 4.

These data are expressed in British thermal units,

because some common denominator is necessary to compare such
unlike quantities as tons of coal, barrels of oil, and cubic
teet of gas.

An energy equivalent is determined for water-

power.
Bituminous coal has lost heavily in the energy market

- 31 Table 2.

Fuel efficiency trends in the United States tor
the principal coal-using induatries
Reduction
trom base
Pounds
Industrial uses
period
(percent)

Steam Railroads:
Pounds per 1,000 gross ton-miles
freight service:
·
·
Average 1919-20 •••••••••••••••
Average 1938 ••••••••••••••••••
Average 1939 ••••••••••••••••••
Pounds per passenger-train carmile:
Average 1919-20 •••••••••••••••
Average 1938 ••••••••••••••••••
Average 1939 ••••••••••••••••••
Electric-public-utility power plants~
Pounds per kilowatt-hour 1919 ••••• ~
Pounds per kilowatt-hour 1938 ••••••
Pounds per kilowatt-hour 1939 ••••••
Iron and Steel--pounds coking coal per
ton or pig:

170
115
112
18.5
14.9
14.8

19.5
20.0

3.2
1.4

56~2

1.4

1919 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3,577
1938 ••••.•••.•••••••••.•••••••••••• 2,884

1939 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2,853
Coke manufacture: Savings ot heat values
through recovery of gas, tar, light oils,
and breese by extention or by-product in
place or beabive coking, 1913-1939,
expressed as a percent of coal used tor all
coke in 1939 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Source:

32~4

34.1

56.2

19~1

20.2

20.6

Minerals Yearbook, 1940

since 1918, and particularly during the depression years.
Yet, in spite of

this decline, it still remains the prin-

cipal source or energy.

Since no comparable data is avail-

able tor Utah, no trend can be worked out to show whether
or not coal is being displaced as rapidly in Utah as it is
in other parts or the United States.

It can be proved,

however, tnat natural gas has made decided inroads on the
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fuel markets of this locality since it was first brought
to Utah in 1929.

Evidence also seems to point to the·

conclusion that more and more fuel oil is being burned in
the state.
In table 3 the trend of gas sales and of coal displacement due to the invasion of gas is presented for the
years 1929 to 1940.

To compare gas with coal, cubic feet

of gas must be converted into tons of coal.
each fuel to a

B~u

By converting

basis and allowing for the burning

efficiency of each, it is found that 22,073 oubic feet of ·
natural gas and 38,627 cubic feet of coke oven gas are

- 33 average equivalents o~ one ton o~ coal.l 3

By dividing

natural gas sales and coke oven gas sales by the appropriate equivalents, we get same idea

o~

the extent coal

bas been displaced by gas.
Trend of coal displacement by natural gas and coke
oven gas in Utah, 1929-1940
aGa~ ·· sales in thousands:
:Percentage
•
•
Coal
of
cubic
feet
gas
•
•
•
•
••
••
:Equivalent:output in:equivalent
:Natural gas:Coke oven
tons of
thousands:is of coal
:
coal
of tons •• OUt;QUt
sas
••
••
••
••
••
. 17,858
394,198 ••
5,161 ••
.35
•• 3,645;820
•• 165,171
4,258 •
3.88
3,350 ••
6.58
•• 4,774,234 •• 159,374 •• 220,419
•• 258,409
I 5,531,884 •• 300,951
2,852 ••
9.06
•• 5,799,670 : 300,792 •• 270,537 •• 2;675 •• 10.12
•• 6,589;076 •• 274,877 •• 305,629 •• 2,406 •• 12.74
z 8,614,014 •• 357,292 I 399,501 • 2,947 • 13.55
:10,451;958 : . 387,741 : 483,556 •• 3:,247 •• 11.81
:12,340,830 •• 42'7,344 •• 5'70,155 •• 3,809 •• 14.97
:11,600,132 : 443,813 •• 53'7,025 •• 2,947 •• 18.22
:13,100,300 •• 469,183 •• 605,644 •• 3,340 •• 18.13
:14,'717,511 I 505,111 •• 679,841 •• 3,524 •• 19.29

Table 3.

.
Year

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

.

.

.

'

•

Source:

••

•

.

.

••

••

Mountain Fuel Supply Company

Utah coal meets this same competition in other markets.
In California, which is potentially the best market tor Utah
coal outside the state, 14 it is estimated that natural gas
and fuel oil are taking the place of coal to the extent of

l3

These calculations were made by the Mountain Fuel Supply
Company.
14 Utah has a 50 cents per ton freight advantage to Southern
California. Freight rates to Northern California and
Nevada are equal for Utah and Wyoming coal. In all other
markets, Utah producers are at a competitive disadvantage
because ot higher freight charges.
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112,000 tons daily, or 41,172,000 tons of coal per year. 15
Undoubtedly the continuous expansion of the use of these
fuels has taken place in part, at the expense ot the Utah
producers.
The competition ot fuel oil in Utah is no small item.
It was reported in 1936 that 133,899 tons or coal were
displaced by oil. 16 It is rather difficult to determine
how muCh fuel oil is being used as a direct competitor ot
coal in the last few years.

Public information on the

subject is entirely lacking.

It seems logical to conclude,

however, tbat the trend or oil consumption is still upward.
More oil-burning domestic equipment is being installed;
Diesel engines are replacing coal burners; and oil burning
bunkers and ships have wholly eliminated Utah's tidewater
market.
Hydroelectrical energy competes directly with coal tor
such tunctions as cooking and water heating in the home,
running of machinery and equipment in the factory, and supplying fuel for locomotives.

Gas and oil generated electricity

likewise are similar competitors.

Engineering surveys

estimate that more than tour million tons of coal are being
displaced by the electrical energy at Boulder Dam, Grand
Coulee ·Dam, and Bonneville Dam. 17 Undoubtedly, Utah coal
output bas been reduced to some extent as a result of this

15 Arthur E. Gibson, Secretary of Price Chamber of Commerce,
Price, Utah.
Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,
22• cit., p. 70.
17 Prom~e file of Senator George M. Miller, Carbon
County, Utah.
16
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cheap electrical competition.
The effect of economic changes 2n the coal industry.
Over-capitalization of productive facilities, efficient
utilization of coal itself, loss of local markets to other
fuels, loss of markets on the Pacific Coast, loss of the
steamship trade, curtailment of railroad use, and depressed
economic conditions in general; all of these, and probably
other factors as well, have had the effect of seriously
disrupting the coal industry of Utah.

The stresses and

strains of rapid economic change have brought the tax problem into bold relief.

There is definitely justification

for a reappraisal of the scheme of taxing coal mines .
Threatened with economic collapse, the coal industry
fought valiantly to save its markets.

When consumers began

to clamor for a cleaner fuel, the producers obliged with
coal that was "washed, dried, sized, blended, and waxed."
When coal consumers turned to central heating plants which
operated automatically, the industry prepared a suitable
fuel for such uses.

Likewise, when the consumers asked for

a cheaper fuel, the mines began to install mechanized equipment in an effort to reduce the costs of coal production.
Great strides have been made within the last few years
in the development and adoption of mechanical equipment
peculiar to the industry.

Indeed, the advances have been

as far-reaching as in any other industry.
remove the coal from the earth.

Marvelous machines

Huge factory-like tipples

and cleaning plants prepare the coal for the consumers'
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market.

Utah's mines are among the most completely mechan-

ized in the nation.

In 1938, 93.7 percent of the coal mined

in Utah was cut by machines and 49 percent was loaded by
machines.

For the nation as a whole, 87.5 percent of the

coal extracted was cut by machines
was mechanically loaded.l8

an~

only 21.4 percent

As a result, Utah mines are not

only turning out a better fuel than they formerly produced,
but also a cheaper fuel.
But it must not be overlooked that the coal companies
are still burdened with more mines than are necessary, and
with more capital equipment than has ever been productive.
Regardless of how foolish or shortsighted these investments
may have been, they are now part of the characteristics of
the coal industry.

Since current production must bear the

fixed costs of all of this excess capacity, it is reasonable
to conclude that each ton of coal is being produced at a
much higher cost than would be necessary if the full capacity were utilized, or if the mining facilities were limited
to that which was productive.
Among these fixed coats are taxes.

Inasmuch as coal

is assessed whether it is mined or not, and since machinery
and equipment is assessed whether it is idle or operating,
the burden of the tax is directly affected by the rate of
coal extraction.
production.
mined?
l8

We have shown the precipitous decline in ·

But what about the tax coat per ton of coal

Have the revisions in assessment values been

United States Minerals Yearbook, 1940.
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sufficient to maintain a uniform
increased?

tax~

Or has the burden

In view of the_ depressed economic condition

of the industry, these questions justify an answer.
Then, too, gas, oil, and hydroelectric power have established themselves in part of the original coal market.

There

is no reason to expect that coal will be able to successfully
regain the market it has lost to these competitors.

The coal

industry bas reason to expect, however, that its tax burden
shall not exceed those of its competitors.

There is the per-

ilous possibility that some of these competing fuels are
being given preferential tax

trea~ent.

Since these fuels

are creating little new demand, but are merely invading the
coal market, it is only fair that coal should not be required
to bear a

discr~natory

tax burden.

In our analysis of the coal mine tax in the next few
sections, we shall try to determine just what effect these
economic changes in the indus try have had on the tax which
the Utah coal mines bear.

- 38 THE TAX BURDEN

The burden which the ad valorem tax imposes on the
coal industry is not a homogeneous load that can be isolated
and analyzed with ease for each year the tax has been in
effect.

This is far from the truth.

Although the tax is

applied to all companies in precisely the same manner, no
two operators pay exactly the same amount of taxes.

There

are several significant variables responsible tor these
differentials.

All mines are over-capitalized to some extent,

but the excess capacity is by no means uniformly distributed
among the companies.

It is also true that all producers

bold considerable coal land in reserve, but some companies
have many times as much coal land as others.

And, since

each ton of current coal production must bear the tax cost
of both excess capacity and reserve land, in addition to
that which is productive, it is reasonable to expect that
there would be varia tiona in the amount of taxes each company would pay.

The tact that coal properties lie in dif-

ferent taxing districts and, in many instances, are subject
to different
burdens.

~11

rates, likewise results in varying tax

Much coal property is subject to not only state,

county, and school levies, but to a municipal levy as well.
Differences in tax rates may also occur between the different counties and school districts.
Company variations.

The wide variety of tax costs per

ton of coal mined tor 15 producing coal companies in Carbon
County are illustrated in table 4.

These data were prepared

- 39 in 1925 by the State Board of Bqui1ization.l

Unfortunately,

no data on the burden that the tax imposed are available
prior to 1925.

However, the fact that the original sched-

ule of assessment values was revised in 1921, and that higher
values were placed on several classes of coal land, seems to
indicate that mines were underassessed during the first two
years that the system operated. 2 Experimentation with the
new schedule was carried on for a few more years, resulting
in some modifications and minor adjustments.

By 1925 the

procedure was well established, and the Board published its
first report on the tax burden of different companies under
the new set-up.
Table 4.

.

Company ••
•
••

A

B

c

••
••
••
z

D

E

F
G
H
I

J
K
L
M
N

0

•
I

••

Average j•
•

A portion of this study appears in table 4.

St&-tem.ents showing an analysis of taxation tor producing coal mines in Carbon County tor the year 1925
Tax in cents •• Tax in cents
•• Total general
•
on coal land • on mach. & 1mp. •• property tax in
•• oents per ton
for eaoh ton •• for eaoh ton
•
ot ooa1 mined • of coal mined
•• ot coal mined
11.4
17.5
17.9
8.5
4.1
5.1
1.8
2.2
1.4
1.5
1.4
1.0
•6
1.3
.4
3.8

.•
••
••
••

'

,•

••

••
••
••

.•

7.4
.5
4.6
5.8
1.4
3.1
2.0
2.4
2.2
2.0
2.2
2.2
1.2
1.6
3.0

••
••
••
••

••

••

••
:
••
:
••

.•
••

••

:
••
••
••

••

18.8
18.0
17.9
13.1
9.9
6.5
4.9
4.2
3.8
3.7
3.4
3.2
2.8
2.5
2.0
6.8

1 State Board ot Equalization and Assessment, Fifteenth
2

Biennial Report, p. 166.
See P• 14 .
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It can be seen that the proportion

or

the tax that is

based on machinery and improvements averaged approximately
44 percent. This percent had not changed in 1935, 3 and it
is probable that this proportion bas increased considerably
since 1935.

Land values were reduced in 1936 by an appreci-

able amount, 4 while at the same time expert assessors were
revaluing the capital equipment of mines.5

As a result,

much unassessed property has been added to the assessment
rolls, and much underassessed equipment has been given its
tull value.

No doubt these two factors have made the tax

on the equipment and improvements even more burdensome to
the mine owners.
Table 4 also shows that taxes per ton of coal mined
vary considerably between companies.

These variations can

be accounted for mainly on the basis of the varying amounts
of coal land owned by the company and by the rate of coal
production.

It production is high, excess equipment is

reduced to the minimum, and tax costs per ton of coal mined
are greatly reduced.

The burden per ton, of course, will

increase as coal production slumps because the assessment
will not be reduced in proportion.

A later study prepared under the direction ot
Dr. J. R. Mahoney6 tor the years 1928 to 1933 emphasizes
the variations 1n taxes paid by different companies on the
3

4
5
6

Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,

21?.• ill·, p. 43.
See P• le.
State Ta±' Commission, Fifth Biennial Report, p. 84.
"SOme 'Economic Aspects of the Utah Tax Laws in Operation,"
PP• l8A to 20A.
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assessed equipment valuation.

On the same basis, the

company with the highest tax costs was assessed $1,217,773
on its capital equipment.

Dividing its average annual out-

put of 555,984 tons ot coal by the assessed valuation, it
is discovered that this

co.mpan~

produced

onl~

.46 of a

ton for each dollar of equipment valuation.
The tact that ·the values of land and improvements were
listed separately in this study made another interesting
comparison possible.

Wide variations in the relationship

ot these items to each other were presented.

In some cases,

the assessed valuation or land was as low as 10 percent ot
the value of improvements.

In other cases, it was found

that land assessments were more than 300 percent ot the
value of improvements.

Where this percentage runs to a

high figure the taxes per ton of coal mined are likely to

be large. 7

This will be true especially if . there is not an

accompanying large production of coal in proportion to the
land owned by the company.
In some oases the companies are finding it to their
interest to allow coal land to revert to the county with
the idea that when it is later needed it can be leased and
paid tor under a royalty basis.

By so doing, important

reductions in the assessed value or coal land are being
realized.
Time variations.

Not only are there variations in the

tax burden or different companies, but these variations are
7

Table 4 illustrates this point.

- 43 -

quite marked in different years.

It is with these time

differences that we are primarily concerned in this study.
Although differentials in the tax burden of companies are
significant, they can largely be attributed to the policies
of the operators.

On the other hand, marked differences

in the tax burden for different years are mainly a function
of the tax.
The task of analyzing time variations is more difficult
than making comparisons between companies.

In fact, there

is no clear-cut method of grouping pertinent data from all
coal companies for purposes of inductive analysis.

The

burden of the tax may change over a period of years, but
analyzing just how much of the change is due to each of
the dynamic factors that may be responsible is an almost
insuperable assignment.

Consequently, we must resort to

averages, trends, and tendencies for our conclusions.
Despite their short-comings, these methods represent the
best available tools which can be applied in the study of
important problems of taxation; and we have reason to
expect that they yield fairly reliable answers in most
eases.

However, it must be recognized that conclusions

arrived at through theoretical analysis must be drawn with
some reservation.
At no time have state taxing authorities aimed to
provide a uniform tax burden for all coal companies.

They

have been more concerned with the average burden which the
tax imposes.

Whether this policy is justifiable or not,
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it is about the only procedure that could be followed in
regulating the burden of the tax for the industry as a
whole.

Apparently there has never been a time since the

ad valorem method was adopted that some companies have not
been paying more taxes than were originally intended by
those who formulated the plan.
other companies that

~ve

Moreover, there have been

paid less than was intended.

The

real criticism against the tax has come from those producers who feel that their tax load is excessive.

They

bring calculations and expert opinions to the Tax Commission
to prove the injustice of their tax burden.

They claim

the tax is discriminatory, that it favors their competitors
who produce under royalty contracts, and that the tax
results in a competitive disadvantage in markets where
other fuels are sold.

From the point of view of the com-

pany, these problems are of vital importance.

Taxing

authorities, however, have more or less ignored these
claims and have continued to interpret the tax in terms
of what the average load should be.
Information on the average tax burden of Utah coal
mines is not easy to gather.

Very little is published on

the subject, and the problem or making original tabulations
requires more time and effort than one could possibly spend
in making a study or this type.

However, from various

sources we have been able to gather a rather complete file
or data on the asses-s ed valuation of mines, taxes paid,
annual production, and the total annual value of the coal

- 45 In oases where these figures were not up-to-

pro~uoed.

date, the necessary information has been supplied through
original tabulations.
In table 5 average taxes per ton of coal mined and per
dollar of gross income are presented for the years 1925
to 1940.

From this table we can get some conception of

the time variations in the average tax burden of Utah
coal mines.
Another type of comparison which illustrates the changes
in the average burden of coal mines for different years may
be shown by comparing the assessed valuation of mines with
the annual production.

For many purposes the assessed

value is a more reliable basis for making comparisons than
taxes paid.

This statement is based on the fact that prop-

erty located in different jurisdictions will take different tax rates in mills.

It property is justly assessed,

two tracts of coal land ot equal worth will be assessed
the same regardless of their jurisdiction.
In order to show the relationship between assessments
and production, the actual figures for each year have been
converted into indices.
of a base year.

This necessitated the selection

After taking many factors into consider-

ation, 1925 seemed to be the most suitable year.

In the

first place, it has the tacit approval of the State Board
of Equalization.

Prior to 1925 the Board was adjusting

and modifying the procedure of taxation, but no changes
were made for sometime after this year even though a rather

- 46 Average taxes per ton or coal mined and per dollar
of sross income tor Utah m1nes 1 1925 to 1949
I
I
Value
I
:
I
Tax
: Produc- : ot coal
1
:Tax cents: cents
: t1on in : mined in 1 General : per ton :per $ ot
:thousands : thouaand~' s property : ot coal : gross
:or tons\~): dollars\
: tax\~J : mined : income
:
:
:
:
:
: 4,690
: $11,991
: $389, 039 .:
8.29
3.25
•• 381,147 :
: 4,374
10,362
8.71 •• 3.68
8.02 •• 3.46
: 4~781
: 11,084
: 383,290 :
•• 374,764 :
4,843
: 12,253
'7.74 •• 3.08
I
7.59 •• 3.08
: 5,161
: 12,725
: 392,193 :
•• 10,515
•• 414,058 :
9.73 : 3.94
: 4:,258
•• 418;948 : 12.51 •• 5.63
I
3;350
7,442
:
•• 404;648 : 14.19 : 7.12
••
: 2:,852
5:,685
••
5,109
373,455 : 13.96
7.25
: 2,675
••
: 2,406
4,746
8.14
: 386;292 : 16.05
: 2,947
6,101
6.07
•• 370,049 : 12.56
••
8.75
: 3,247
7,143(4} : 283,940 :
3.98
3,809
8,370(4) : 287,400 :
7.54
3.35
2,947
6,788(5) : 271,727 :
9.22
4.00
3,340
7.86 • 3.15
8,350(5) : 262,663 :
3,524
9,515(5) : 242,117 :
6.92 • 2.54
••
••
:
8,636
9.97 : 4.48
3,700
352,233 :

Table 5.

Year

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
Avg.

.

:

••

:

Sources: (1) Minerals Yearbooks
(2) Investigating Committee or Utah Governmental
Units, ~· cit. appendix
(3) A Messa~e o~ita1 Importance to Every User of
Cofil an Gas in Utah, Mountain""F'Ue1 Supply com...

pa:ny,p. w - - -

Minerals Yearbook, 1938
Estimates from company sources

(4}
(5)

complete study or the tax burden was made in 1925.8

Then

too, economic condi tiona were more normal than they ha.d
been tor a number ot years.

The war boom and the sub-

sequent depression had both passed and business prospects
were good.
8

An additional reason tor selecting 1925 is the

See P• 39.
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tact that it was included in table 5.

For comparative

purposes an earlier base year would have been less desirable.
The comparison between the two indices is shown in
figure 5.

When production declines and assessments show

no corresponding movement, the tax burden has increased.
Conversely, a production increase without an offsetting
increase in assessments suggests a lighter tax burden.
Only in five depression years has the average tax
burden per ton ot coal mined been higher than the ten cents
per ton royalty which operators pay on leased land.

Several

factors undoubtedly prevented taxes from becoming even more
burdenaomes

(1) the 1933 rate reductions which amounted

to 10 percent of the assessed value on all classes ot coal
land except class "A"; 9 ( 2·) the policy of the companies
which permitted large tracts ot reserve land to revert
back to the counties; (3) an upward trend of production
that began in 1935; and (4) the general revision of assessment values 1n the spring ot 1936. 10 All of these factors
combined to reduce tax costs to figures far below the
royalty level during the past few years.
Although there was a marked disparity between assessments and production during these depression years, it is
doubtful that the ad valorem tax was more burdensome to
the mines than it was to the other classes of property
that were assessed on the same basis.

In both table 5

and figure 5 there seems to be sufficient evidence to

9 See p. 15.
10 See P• 16.
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concl~ion

that coal mines are not excessively

Although the economic changes which haYe taken

place in the past 22 years have been upsetting to the
industry, and at times have almost doubled the average
burden of taxation; nevertheless, the ad valorem system
has been flexible enough to meet these changes.

The 6.92

cents per ton tax in 1940 does not represent over-taxation.
Rather, it appears to be the lowest per-ton tax that the
mines have borne in many years.

Before we could be sure

about this statement, however, we would need to know something about the ability of the mines to shi:ft their tax.

- 49 Changed economic conditions alter the ability of mines to
shift the pecuniary burden of their tax.

It may be that a

tax of seven cents per ton would be more burdensome to the
mines now than a ten cents
years ago.

pe~

ton tax would have been 20

This would be true if the operators formerly

bore only half the incidence of the tax

assess~d

against

them; however operatlDrs now assume the full burden.

This

problam is important enough to justify more complete investigation.
If the present trends of assessments and production
continue (figure 5), it appears that a wide disparity will
devel~p

in which mines may actually be considerably under-

taxed.

At least one conclusion may be safely drawn frqm

the analysis of this section: viz, taxed operators are
being treated preferentially as compared with their competitors on royalty lands.

It the state is still aiming to

maintain a parity between taxes and royalties, the present
trend should suggest some changes.

The direct tax burden in

1940 was lighter per ton of coal mined than it has been in
any year (with the possible exception of 1920) since the
ad valorsm tax was adopted.

This reduction is even more

significant 1n view of the tact that the mill rates which
a~e

applied to the tax base have risen considerably.ll

When taxes paid per dollar of gross income or per ton

o~

coal mined are declining and the mill rates are rising, 1t

11 Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental units,
2E.• ill· p. 46.
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may suggest that the changes in the assessment schedule

ot Ddnes have reduced their value to such an extent that
mine taxes are now out ot line with other property taxes.
Probably the original formula needs to be rechecked.

- 51 THE INCIDENCE OF COAL MINE TAXES
One cannot probe very far into either the theoretical
or practical problema of taxation without running head-on
into the problem of

~cidence.

The tact that taxes, under

certain conditions, may be shifted is a characteristic ot
taxa..t ion that has long been familiar to students and observers ot tax systems.

Perhaps no other aspect of the

subject has engaged their interest more.

In analyzing some

taxes, it is quite easy to ascertain who bears the principal load; but in the case of other taxes, discovering
who assumes the pecuniary burden is a difficult economic
problem.
There is no common agreement as to who bears the coal
mine taxation load.

Although figures occasionally appear

which tend to convey the idea that taxes on coal mines are
eventually shifted on to the consumer in the form of higher
coal prices, the problem is not so simple as the figures
indicate.

In most instances such data are merely subtle

propaganda sponsored by the companies upon whom the tax is
imposed •

To illustrate, the dollar in figure 6 appeared

in an attractive advertisement in a leading Utah newspaper.
Beneath the diagram, the companies stated that •yearly taxes
paid by those engaged in the production and distribution o.f
Utah coal amount to t2,035,ooo.• 1 But although these taxes
are paid by the producers and distributors of Utah coal,
the advertisement obviously conveys the idea that the tax

1 Salt

~

Tribune, January 30, l936.
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bill is eosting each consumer seven cents out of each
dollar he spends tor coal.

Insurance &
;- compensation 3t~

Labor 62¢

Figure 6.

How the coal dollar is spent

This naive assumption often made by business men and
the public is but a half-truth.

The thought behind this

reasoning is that costs must be met, and accountants put
taxes down with the costs; hence, all the producer has to
do

is add the tax to the price and automatically he gets

it back.

The grocer, we are

info~ed

by the newspapers,

raises the price of butter, eggs, bacon, and spices in order
to get back his tax; the landlord passes all his taxes to
the tenant; the

fa~er

adds his school and road taxes to
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the price of his wheat; and coal companies, so the popular
theory runs, pass on their taxes to the long-suffering
public with unerring certainty.

The theory is simplicity

itself.
What the theory does not explain, however, is the
reason why the coal producer should be so interested in
convincing the consumer that the government slices seven
cents out of each dollar he spends for coal, if he bears
no part of the tax assessed against

~.

The theorist who

makes the consumer the ultimate victim of any tax also tails
to give any reason why prices could not have been raised
before the imposition of a new tax, or an increased tax,
just as easily as prices could be raised after the levy
is made.
The tact is that this naive but popular theory has no
sound basis.

It is but one form of popular fiction.

Students

of taxation have probed into the secrets of shifting and
incidence and have come out with an answer that is less
easily diagramed, but considerably more realistic.

It is

true that many taxes levied on a producer or a dealer
raises prices, rarely by the whole tax, usually by a major
part, occasionally by a small part only.

The problem,

therefore, is one of degree of "shiftability."

What portion

of the coal mine tax can be shifted to the consumer?
Under what conditions is shifting possible!
Conditions of shifting.

Tax shifting requires that

the person who originally pays the tax to the government
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shall be able to recoup himself by means of some counterbalancing transaction.

The direction in which a given tax

will be shifted depends somewhat upon the line of least
resistance.

In general, however, the problem is a study

of conditions under which a person paying a given tax can
increase the price of his commodity in order to shift the
increased cost that the tax imposes.

In this analysis we

shall consider tax shifting as one aspect of the theory of
value and price, recognizing, at the same time, the possibility that some of the tax may be shifted backward.
Under competitive conditions the factors determining
price are supply and
upon suppliers.

~emand.

Obviously, when they are subjected to the

tax they must move first.
as yet.

Coal mine taxes are imposed

The demanders are not concerned

The transfer of the tax from the producers to the

consumers is not done voluntarily.

That is, buyers of

coal do not offer to pay higher prices simply because they
want to be generous to those who pay the tax.

some form

of economic compulsion is necessary, but this compulsion
must be exerted by influencing the available supply of
coal.

What the suppliers can do is go on a strike, so to

speak; that is, they can curtail the supply, which will
tend to raise prices. 2
Marginal analysis.

One form of curtailment comes as

a result of the forced withdrawal of the marginal producers
2

Conceivably, they can curtail the demand of what they
buy as well as the supply of what they sell; but for the
sake of brevity, the alternative of backward shifting
is ignored here.

- 55 from the market.

The supply might also be reduced and the

higher prices obtained without eliminating producers, if
some of the suppliers cease producing the marginal portion
of their former output.

Whether or not this occurs depends

on the degree of organization and cooperation among producers.

In any event, it is the marginal supply that is

eliminated.
Other things being equal, therefore, shifting is most
likely to take place when the tax levied strikes all competitors.proportionately, including, of course, the marginal
competitors.

When some taxpayers have to compete with un-

taxed rivals, the latter are the ones who set the price.
In the coal industry taxation tends to be uniform.
mines are exempt.

No

Each mine owner must pay taxes on the

coal deposits to which he holds title, and the per-ton
value tends to equal that of competitors.

The effect of

such a tax can be illustrated by a simple theoretical
schedule (table 6).
Table 6 . The effect of a tax on marginal mines
•
Profit
• Production •
••
•
•
Mine •
costs
Price •• Profit • Tax •• after t ax

..

A
B

c

D
E

F
G
H

..••
..•
•
••
I

$2 .65
2.'70
2 .75
2.80
2 .85
2 . ~0
~ .95 '

3.00

..
•
..••
.••
.•
:
.•

$3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00

.•
••
••
••
••

.•
••
••

$ .35
.30
'

'

.25
. 20
.15

.
..• $ .10
.•• .10
•
.10
.•• .10
.10

.1.0

•

.oo

..
•

•
.oe ..•

.10
.10
.10

.
.
•
.••
••
••

.•
••

$ .25
. 20
.15
.10
.05
.00
-.05
-.10
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Before the imposition of the tax, each of the eight
mines could sell its coal at a price that would tend to
cover ali costs of production, although mine nH" received
no profits.

In column six the profits are shown after a

tax amounting to

te~

cents per ton is imposed.

!t will be

observed that mine "H" and also mine "G" now incur a deficit that may cause them to retire from business, in which
case the supply will be curtailed, and the price will rise.
Mine "F" becomes the no-pro.fit or marginal-producing unit.
If the procedure outlined in this table carries through,
the six companies that remain solvent will be able to shi.ft
a large portion of their taxes in the form of higher prices.
Since the producers bear the impact of the tax, the
buyers are not concerned unless the supply is curtailed and
a price rise results.
ers act.

vnly when this happens do the demand-

Some of them may buy less coal and use the reduc-

ed amount more efficiently.

others may turn to substitute

fuels it they are available, thus curtailing their coal
purchases wholly or in part.

As a result, prices which are

a function of both supply and demand will tend to decline.
Elasticity of demand.

The demand for different products

is not equally sensitive to price changes, however.

The

nature of the demand, especially with regard to the degree
of elasticity, must be considered.

Elasticity of demand

means the degree to which the amount demanded will be af.fected by changes in price.
matter.

~lasticity

is always a relative

The general principle is that the more inelastic

- 57 -

the demand is for a commodity, the more certainly and completely can the tax on this commodity be shifted.

If con-

sumers will buy practically as much of a commodity at a
higher price as they will buy at a lower price, then the
increase in price will not check consumption, and tax
shifting is easily accomplished.

un the other hand, if

slight changes in price cause great fluctuations in demand,
the producer will naturally hesitate long before risking
the severe ahrinkage in sales which even a moderate price
advance would be sure to produce.
Coal is usually classified as having a relatively inelastic demand.

In other word, people buy coal even though

prices force them to forego other purchases.

There is dan-

ger, however, in emphasizing this point too strongly.

Coal

does have an importance for domestic heating and industrial
activities which is second to no other fuel, but in no
sense does it dominate the heat and energy market.
we have noted the curtailment of coal demand.

In fact,

uther fuels

have been rapidly assuming greater importance as coal has
continued a steady retreat.

Producers had less difficulty

in shifting taxes to the consumer in 1919 than they have at
the present time.

Coal had fewer competitors then.

markets were expanding and prices were high.
for coal was inelastic.
in order to shift an

~be

Its

demand

If the price was raised a tew cents

increase~

tax, practically as much

coal would be purchased at the new price as was taken at the
old.
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Bconomic changes in the industry have made taxes less
shiftable.

Efficiencies have reduced the amount of coal

each consumer requires for a given operation.

Many former

customers have turned to gas, oil, or hydro-electric power.
Markets have contracted and prices are so low that the federal government has intervened to save the industry from
ruin.

uemand has become more elastic.

Any price increase

to offset a tax levy would be carefully considered.

The

effect of such an experiment might be a loss of coal markets, and increased sales of substitutes.
The chief fallacy in the theory that the consumer pays
all the taxes, therefore, lies in the assumption that the
seller alone determines whether or not a tax will be shifted.
?rices are set by buyers and sellers.

If buyers are un-

able or unwilling to pay a higher price for the fuel they
burn in order to assume the incidence of a tax, the seller
must either assume the tax himself,. or else run the risk of
elimination from production.

The influence of the buyers

is sufficiently important to prevent a complete shifting of
the tax; and since the demand for coal is becoming more elastic, the buyer influence is even more significant.

Although

the producers may be desirous of raising prices by the full
amount of their tax, or even more, their discretion is limited· by the fact that the demand for coal is not dictated
by them.
aven though the demand for coal is becoming more elastic, it is still relatively inelastic.

In some areas
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competition is keen, but in other localities coal has the
market much to itself.

It is possible, therefore, for coal

to meet the competition of gas and oil where they threaten,
and rafse the price in less competitive areas. 3 In this
manner the operators could shift the tax to "selected11
bearers who are not in a powerfUl position to resist price
increases.

So far as elasticity is concerned, there is

still much reason to believe that coal taxes can be shifted.
Immobility of capital.

There are other factors, however,

that tend to discourage tax shifting.
immobility of capital.

One of these is the

If taxes become burdensome to an

industry, and its capital is easily withdrawn, there is a
good opportunity to shift the tax.

The capital will seek em-

ployment where taxes are less heavy, or where profits are
more certain.

If, however, the capital is largely fixed

and specialized, withdrawal is much slower and shifting is
correspondingly retarded.

In the long run, an industry

which is subjected to heavy taxes on fixed capital can gradually withdraw through the process of depreciation until
the output declines sufficiently to cause the price to
advance.
The coal industry is tremendously over-capitalized
with fixed, specialized equipment.

As more of the processes

are performed by huge mechanical devices, the possibility
of shifting the tax burden becomes more remote.

In the days

when a coal miner's equipment consisted of a pick, drill,
3

In setting coal prices, the National Bituminous Coal
Commission permits lower prices in areas where the competition of other fuels is keen.
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lamp, and mule-drawn pit-car, there was no serious economic
pressure to keep the mine running.

If demand fell off, no

large deficit would pile up if the mine closed down for a
few months until business picked up.

But, if demand slack-

ens now, rather than stop operations the company will take
almost any kind of price reduction.

If the price will pay

the variable costs plus something to apply to fixed costs,
it will be more profitable to operate than to close down.

-The

nature of costs.

-

This problem of costs must also

be considered from another angle.

The influence of a tax

imposed on an increasing-costs industry will not be the
same as that imposed on a decreasing-costs industry.
Since coal mining is an extractive industry, the type
that usually follows the pattern of increasing costs, it
would seem logical to analyze the effect of coal mine taxes
in terms of increasing costs.

If our study were based on

long run phenomenon, this would be the logical approach.
But at present the coal mining industry is a decreasingcost industry, and in this study it will be analyzed from
this point of view.

In figure 7 data that bear out this

claim are illustrated.
Undoubtedly, the reason for the present cost pattern
is to be found in the over-capitalization of the industry.
The idle equipment as well as the productive equipment is
included in the overhead.

Hence, each ton of coal produced

must bear not only its share of the fixed costs of productive equipment, but also a share of the fixed costs of idle
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Figure 7.

A comparison of production, operating costs,
and all mining costs for Utah coal mines,
April to December 1937, and the year 1936
Data source:

equipment.

Appendix E

It stands to reason, therefore, that the larger

the production volume the smaller will be the fixed costs
per ton ot coal.

Figure 7 confirms this logical conclusion.

When a tax is imposed on a decreasing-costs industry
a~d

the supply is decreased to raise the price, the company

must not only increase the price by the amount of the tax to
completely shift it, but by the

~ount

of the tax plus the

higher per-unit costs resulting from the reduced volume
produced.

Thus, if all other conditions of shifting are

favorable, an increase in price greater than the tax will
result.

If the company does not succeed in raising the price
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sufficiently to offset the full amount of the tax plus the
increasing cost per ton which results from the reduced supply, it has failed in its effort to shift completely its
tax load to the consumer.
The exact explanation of the nature of industries with
decreasing costs and what happens when taxes are imposed
upon them is somewhat obscure.

The situation in such indus-

tries may perhaps be conceived as illustrated in table 7.
Table 7. Production costs of various coal mines.
Tons ••
•
•
••
E
c
D
proA
• F
•• B
duced:
•
•

.

100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000

••
:$2.35
2.30
2.25
2.20
2.15
•• 2.10
2.05
: 2.00
• 1.95
1.90

.
.

.

..
•

: $2 .40
2.35
2.30
• 2.25
2.20
2.15
2.10
•
2.05
2.00
1.95

.
..
.

..
.•

: $2 .45
•• 2.40
• 2.35
•• 2.30
•• 2.25
2.20
2.15
2.10
2.05
•• 2.00

.

.
..
.

Avg. ••
costs: 2.125: 2.175: 2.225

.•

.
.

.
.•

: $2 .50
•• 2.45
•• 2.40
• 2.35
• 2.30
•• 2.25
•• 2.20
2.15
2.10
2.05

..

••

.:$2.55
2.50
.• 2.4·
5
2.40
.•• 2.35
2.30

2 .25
2.20
2.15
•• 2.10

.
.

.

2.275:
•

..
.•

:$2.60
2.55
2.50
2.45
2.40
2.35
•• 2.30
2.25
•• 2.20
• 2.15

.•
G

.•

..•
•

H

. : $2 .65 :$2.70
2.60
2.65
2 .55 • 2.60
•• 2.50
2 .55
2.45
2.50
•• 2.40
2 .45
2.35
2 .40
2 .30 • 2.35
2 .25
2 .30
2 .20
2.25

.
..
2.325: 2.375:

.

..
.
.
.•

2.425: 2.475

According to this hypothetical illustration, eight
mines are engaged in production.
than others, and presumably mine

Some have higher costs
11

H11 is marginal.

Each

mine operates under conditions of decreasing costs and must,
we shall assume, cover average costs or retire from operations.
The cost figure in table 7 indicates the

de~rease

in

costs resulting from the production of additional units.
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Thus it will cost mine "A" $2.35 per ton if only 100 tons
are produced, and f2.30 per ton if the total production is
increased to 200 tons, and so on.

~f

the price is f2.50

per ton mine "H" can stay in competition and prod uce its
capacity output of 1,000 tons, but if the price drops below
$2.50, it can no longer remain in competition.

On the basis of the above assumption, the supply which
might be forthcoming can be presented in tabular form as
follows:
Table

a.

The supply of coal from various mines at a given
rice
G
H
Total
F
A
B
c
D
E

Price
$2.50
2.45
2.40
2.35
2.30
2.25
2.20
2.15
2.10

1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000

1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000

1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000

1000
1000
1000
1000
1000

1000
1000
1000
1000

1000
1000
1000

1000
1000

1000

8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
000

If we now assume a demand schedule, it will be possible
to illustrate the probable effect of a ten cents per ton
tax (table 9) •
With the demand schedule as in column 3, the equilibrium
price will be $2.30.

If, now, a tax amounting to ten cents

per ton is assessed on all coal mining property, production
will be curtailed as shown in the revised supply schedule in
column 4.

With the additional coat resulting from the tax,

- 64 The ini'luence of ten cents per ton tax on coal
12roduction
Supply after
Demand
Price
tax of 10'
SUJ2J2li

Table 9.

$2.50
2.45
2.40
2.35
2.30
2.25
2~20

2.15
2.10

8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
000

****

000
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000

6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
000
000
000

and the demand schedule remai?ing the same, neither mine
"H" nor

11

G" (table 7) is able to stay in the market, and as

a result · the supply is reduced by 2,000 tons.

The new equi-

librium price is $2.35, an increase of five cents over the
former price.
the tax.

This, it will be observed, is only half of ·

Theoretically, therefore, the companies are able

to shift only half of the tax assessed against them.
·However, it is possible that an industry of decreasing
costs may show a difi'erent situation.

If all firms are

equally efficient so that there is no marginal concern, the
price may advance by more than the amount of the tax thus
resulting in a complete shifting of the tax burden.

Condi-

tions somewhat of this character prevail in a well-developed
industry o.f decreasing costs in which large and increasing
output are centered in a few large concerns.

But these

industries tend to have few major competitors and are themselves not competitive in the sense that their prices are
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set in the market.

Here we have a state of monopolistic

competition.
we come now to the close of our investigation of incidence, and to a consideration of the question of whether
the economic changes which have disrupted the coal industry
have affected the ability of operators to shift their tax
burden.
In the first place we have seen that there is no basis
to the theory that all taxes are passed on to the consumer.
Even though mine taxes are a cost of production, it is not
always possible to shift costs.

The graveyard of bankrupt

businesses is solemn evidence of this fact.

Probably there

is no better example of the possibilities of deficits than
in the coal industry itself.

In an industry which lacked

11 cents per ton of covering its costs of production in
1936,4 who would be so audacious as to suggest that all tax .
costs are shifted to the consumer?
Equally absurd is the theory that taxes stay where they
are put.

Since a tax is a cost of operations, the operator

is going to shift it if he can.
not is going to depend on the

Whether he is successful or

relationsh~p

position to that of the consumer.

of his economic

Shifting is a contest

between the suppliers and the demanders.

The outcome is

wholly dependent on the economic power each is prepared to
exert.

It the producer can exert more economic pressure on

the buyers than the purchasers can withstand, the producer

4

See p. 1.
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will be able to shift some of his tax burden.

~ut,

if the

economic defense of the consumer cannot be broken by the producer, the operators will have to bear a major part of their
tax burden.
~he

relation of these two forces is not constant.

fact, it may change frequently and vary widely.

~n

At the time

the ad valorem tax was adopted there was much evidence which
leads us to believe that · a major portion of the tax could be
shifted to the consumer.

Demand was outrunning production.

New industrial markets and new geographical markets were
opening up.

Most of the capital equipment was operating;

therefore, costs per ton of output were rather low.

Coal had

no serious competitors; consequently, demand was inelastic,
and the tax applied uniformly to all producers regardless o·f
whether they were marginal or profit-making companies.
Many of these factors have changed since the tax system
was adopted in 1919.

~nstead

of coal producers being aggres-

sive enterprisers, they are now defensive enterprisers.

With

less coal being used for a given operation, owing to fuel
efficiencies, and with serious competitors invading the coal
market, it seems logical to conclude that the demand for
coal has become considerably more elastic in recent years.
Declining production, rapid mechanization, and the demand
for prepared. coal have resulted in excess capacity, decreasing costs, capital immobility, and a wider tax base.

The

net result of all of these factors is an industry which
must produce at any coal price that will cover variable
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costs plus any additional amount that might apply to fixed
costs.

lf this happens to be enough to cover completely

all costs, then the major portion of the tax can be shifted.
~ut

if the realization from sales is not sufficient to cover

all costs, it is rather far-fetched to suggest that taxes
are shifted.
The uniform applic.ation of the tax to all companies has
been maintained, and submarginal mines are still being forced
out of production.

Three large vtah mines discontinued op-

erations in 1938 and 1939.5 Depressed economic conditions
resulted in the withdrawal of many others in earlier years
of the decade.

With fewer mines supplying the demand, it

seems that the supply could be limited to a quantity that
would cover all costs, including taxes.

It is doubtful,

however, that mines would run the risk of further surrendering their markets to competing fuels just to be able to
shift completely all costs to the consumer.

Furthermore,

the defense tactics of coal companies have driven them together into a trade association.

As a result, they have

given up their autonomy to certain degrees in order to
pool their indiv+dual interests.

While the association

does not quarantee the survival of all mines, it does regulate in the interest of the industry at large.
The changed condition of the industry seems to warrant
the conclusion that the strategic advantage of the producer
has been weakened, while the economic position of the coal
5

~

Lake Tribune, March 29, 1940, p. 12.
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consumer has been strengthened.

As a result, mines are less

able to shift their tax burden now than they were during the
first decade that the tax was in effect.
In view of the severe competition which now confronts
coal operators, it would be unwise to increase the tax burden
of the coal industry.

Although the direct burden of coal

mines has decreased to a low fi gure during the past few years,
it seems likely that the pecuniary burden is as heavy as
ever.

The coal industry is still in distress despite a

rising production trend and decreasing taxes.

In a subse-

quent section we shall compare its tax position with those
of competing fuels.

But before making these comparisons,

perhaps we should note a few of the advantages of the present
ad valorem procedure.
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REGULATORY ASPECTS OF THE TAX
Altho.u gh this is a study

o~

taxes, we need to pass in

review certain other provisions that are incident to Utah's
procedure . of taxing coal mines.

A tax on natural resources

has come to be more than a source of governmental revenue.
It is judged by more than the usual canons of good taxation.
A resource tax is now recognized as an important instrument
of public administration.

Once the standards of public

policy have been formulated, the taxation system can serve
as a valuable aid in the effective
policy.

administra~ion

of that

In this sense, a tax may be a significant tool of

regulation.
This philosophy is especially important in considering
coal mine taxation.

Coal is a wasting asset; that which is

extracted or wasted in the process of extraction cannot be
reproduced.

The accepted standard, therefore, has come to

be one of conservation.

Each generation is entitled to

only that portion of nature's fuel store which it can prudently use.

The owner

o~

coal property has no moral or

legal right to waste or extravagantly utilize the resource
he controls.

His right to own property is merely a relative

right, and not one that is absolute.
o~

The danger, therefore,

coal supplies being worked in a reckless and extravagant

manner without regard to the welfare

o~

future generations,

can be justifiably regulated through the taxing powers of
the state.
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One important purpose of special taxation is to control
exploitation of coal resources, but frequently the method
adopted is not entirely consistent with the public policy
of conservation.

Whether or not an ad valorem tax is

adapted to a conservation program is questionable.

Instead

of discouraging mining, it seems more plausible to conclude
that an ad valorem property tax will have the opposite
effect; that is, it will encourage the owners to mine out
from under the tax.

If the mines are forced to produce to

offset the tax load, the ad valorem tax is open to some
objection from the point of view of conservation.

Stimu-

lated current production will tend to result in price decreases.

This, in turn, may stimulate demand which again

may be undesirable from the point of view of conservation.
This, no doubt, is carrying the issue out to a very fine
point.

The annual production of coal is kept in check to

some extent by the unwillingness of the public to buy unlimited quantities even at cheaper prices.

This check puts

the brakes on any tendency to produce and market all available coal within a short period.

The tax burden, never-

theless, is ultimately a cost that must be carried by each
ton of coal produced; and in order to meet competition, it
is imperative to balance production with fixed overhead so
that the costs per ton are not greater than the value of
the product.

Companies with large land .holdings and idle

equipment must, therefore, step up their production to
maintain an equilibrium.

Hence, the ad valorem method of

- ?1 taxing coal lands has been an incentive to over-production
within the industry.
had is not known.

How much practical effect the tax has

Unfortunately, no data are available on

this point.
Although there are objections to an ad valorem tax from
the conservation viewpoint, there are provisions in the Utah
system that tend to offset over-production tendencies.

1~e

system tends to prohibit operators from opening mines on all
outcrops.

This is accomplished by placing a higher valuation

on the 40 acres being mined and on the coal within one mile
of a mine opening than is placed on the coal farther back
from the point of operations.

uoal nearest the surface is

easily mined, but it would not be a wise policy for the state
to permit mine owners to extract the coal on the surface and
to forget about the coal that is more difficult to obtain.
After a mine entrance has been abandoned and allowed to cave
in, it is impossible to re-enter the mine to the coal face
through the caved-in area to mine the coal that is left.
To preserve the wealth of the state, it is imperative to prohibit exploitation by requiring that no new mine openings be
made until it is necessary to do so.

~e

procedure of taxa-

tion in Utah quite effectively accomplishes this objective.
Taxing coal until it is mined out need not be entirely
contrary to conservation objectives.

Under the Utah system

provision is made for the assessment of 63 percent ot the
actual coal in the property.

The theory behind the 63 per-

cent is that it will be possible actually to recover only

- 72 this amount, but it is possible in most instances for the
companies to recover more than 63 percent.

Some companies

recover as much as 90 percent of their deposits so that about
27 percent of their production is tax free.
all companies is about 73 percent.

The average for

SOme operators, however,

actually extract only about 40 _peroentl by not mining as
thoroughly as others.

In this case the coal mined bears a

much heavier per-ton tax load.

No doubt the philosophy of

these mine owners is that the increased tax per ton is less
than the increased cost per ton of mining the coal that is
more difficult to get.

The tendency, however, is for the tax

to prevent the exploitation of coal deposits.

The taxation

system seems to provide a real incentive for the operators to
mine clean in order to get as much tax-free coal as possible.2
Taxes levied on output lack this feature.

The most access-

ible coal tends . to be extracted--and taxed--and the remainder
is wasted.

On this point the ad valorem tax seems to have a

defin1 te advantage.
Also among the advantages of the system is its methods
of discouraging large land holdings, thus preventing monopolies.

This is accomplished by

p~oviding

that present

production must carry the tax load for the value of coal in
all idle lands.
is owned.

The cost becomes excessive if too much land

An operating company should be granted the privi-

lege of controlling enough land to insure future operations.
This is necessary to justify the capital outlay for an
1
2

Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental UD!ts,
~-

ill·,

~.,

p. 50.
p. 49.
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efficient production unit.

It is generally believed, how-

ever, that a monopolistic condition arising from the control
of all the most accessible coal land would be highly detrimental.
The present system of taxing coal lands on an ad valorem
basis effectively prevents one company from profitably holding large tracts for future use.

Large variations in the tax

per ton of coal produced and the tax per dollar of income
illustrate the effect of the amount of land in excess of a
profitable margin, the company becomes overbalanced and either
is forced to drop some of its land holdings or increase production to carry the load.

The latter alternative may be

possible in the short-run, but it has its limitations.

In-

creased production does not solve financial difficulties for
industries whose products tend to have an inelastic demand.
Eventually, limiting land holdings to a reasonable reserve
becomes imperative.

OUtput taxes provide no such penalties

on large land reserves.
Utah's experience with the ad valorem tax has been
highly satisfactory.

Not only does it provide most of the

essentials of conservation, but the tax is a reliable source
of income, it is easily calculated, and its administration
is not difficult.

The mines, however, have repeatedly criti-

cized the tax on the ground that it is discriminatory and
excessively burdensome.

There is no question but that the

tax burden has been rather constant.
have resulted from its imposition.

No wild fluctuations
Yet, there are industries

- ?4 whose tax load has been less burdensome in one period than 1n
others because of the fluctuating character of their tax.
Furthermore, the coal operators contend that their chief
competitors are being given preferential treatment while
coal mines are being singled out for special penalties.

This

is a bold contention.
In view or our analysis up to this point, there seems
to be little basis for this contention.

The procedure of

taxation was carefully worked out, and it has been flexible
enough to permit changes.

Although these changes on occasions

have lagged somewhat, it is doubtful that coal mines have
suffered more than many other Utah industries.

If they have,

the reason is not found in the ad valorem tax, but in the
general depressed condition of the industry.

On the ques-

tion of uniformity we must make a few observations before
drawing conclusions.
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SOME TAX COMPARISONS
General analysis.

It is one thing to advocate taxes,

or to enact taxes for their regulatory effects; it is quite
another thing to recognize that all taxes have regulatory
effects.

Included in the Constitution of Utah is the fol-

lowing statement:
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all
tangible property in the state, according to its value
in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation for the taxation of
such property, so that every person and corporation
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her,
or its tangible property.
It is not difficult to formulate these expressions, but
to devise a workable system that is in even fair accordance
with them is another matter.

Yet, if a tax is not truly uni-

form, it discriminates between economic elements and modifies
the economic order.
Although the problem of tax equalization is among the
most difficult in the field of public administration, it is
also one of the most vital.

Working out bases of comparison

for testing equality is not an exact science.

The presence

of many variable factors tends to force the investigator to
use relative methods.

Equating two unlike taxes on two un-

like industries is a complicated problem, but equating many
unlike taxes on numerous unlike industries is an exceedingly
complex problem.

,

One type of comparison that is quite generally used in
equating tax burdens is taxes per dollar of gross income.
The valuation placed on property for taxation purposes should
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take into consideration its income-producing powers.

This is

one chief element in the commercial world in fixing valuations
on all types of productive properties and should serve as the
basis for tax assessments.

This should be a normal income

rather than one that will vary widely between prosperous and
depression years.

On this basis, a net income is less suit-

able than gross income.
Unfortunately, no current comparative data

available

ar~

which show the tax load that the various industries of the
state pay per dollar of gross yield.

Moreover, the data that

are available do not include the same years in many cases.

One

study which was published in 1934 compares the taxation of several Utah industries in one prosperous year and
year.l

on~

d~pression

Some of these data are included in .table 10.

Table 10.

Taxes in cents p~r dollar of gross operating income
for six Utah industries, 1928 and 1932.

Industries

••

1928

Coal mining
••
Metalliferous mining
Agriculture
Railroads
Power companies
Telephone & telegraph co. :

3.06
2.49
5.70
4.65
9.64
6.23

Average

5.28

.

1932

.

7.13
5.76
11.81
9.00
12.73
8.11
9.09

..
.•

Average
5.10
4.13
8.75
6.83
11.18
7.17
7.19

The data shown in this table are not given as sufficient
basis on which to adjust tax burdens.
one approach to this intricate problem.
1

They merely illustrate
With such information

Committee of Nine Report, Some Economic Aspects of Utah's
Tax Laws in Operation, passrm7
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as a base, and combined with a careful analysis of many
factors that may

b~

oth~r

known or that may be discovered, it is

possible to arrive at conclusions and judgments of justice
which

ar~

sup~rior

to conclusions without such information.

In as many cases as possible,

th~se

comparisons should be

carried over a series of years so that it would be possible
to analyze the tax load during all cyclical phases .
With the exception of the tax on metalliferous mines ,
there has been little change in the relative tax burden of
these industries over a period of years. 2 But while most
assessments have been rather constant regardless of

cycli~al

changes, the net proceeds tax on metalliferous mines has been
fluctuating violently.

The adoption of an occupational tax

in 1935 to supplement the ne t proceeds and ad valorem assessmenta has had only a negligible effect up_onthe erratic fluctuations of the tax on metalliferous property.

These wide

variations are a source of difficulty for all governmental
units depending upon this source of income.

Since the for-

mula for taxing metalliferous mines has been incorporated in
the Constitution, there is nothing that the State Tax Commission can do to equali ze the burden at present.

As a result,

the tax may yield an assessment for mines above or below other
types of property; and insofar as either of these conditions
result, the general obj e ctive stated in the Constitution, of
2

Ibid., passim, and Biennial Reports of the State Tax
Commission, passim.
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uni~ormity

of assessment according to value, is defeated.

Indeed, this is an ironic situation that one section of the
Constitution should provide

~or

uniformity and another section

should set up rigid rules that make uniformity impossible.
Utah's experience with taxes on a net-proceeds basis has
not been very fortunate.

The taxes on most properties are

more burdensome than is the metalliferous mine tax.

The basis

for this statement is the fact that the tax on metal mines
follows the ability to pay principle.

During the depression

period when the coal industry, under relatively unchanged
assessment values, suffered a net loss of

2i

million dollars,3

the net proceeds assessments dropped from $97,032,409 down
to $1,443,458.

This change automatically adjusted the taxes

of metal-producing mines to their ability to pay; but such
obviously preferential treatment undoubtedly disturbed and
modified the operations of the other industries, and, at the
same time, deprived the state of much needed revenue to carry
on its increasing functions.
While the taxation of metalliferous mines is a classical
example of unequal treatment, there is no justification for
believing that it is the only example.

Indeed, there seems

to be rather widespread criticism of the present system of
taxation.

The present critical attitude comes, in a large

measure, from the conviction that our tax system fails properly
to distribute the burden of taxation.
done to equalize the burden
3

o~

If something could be

taxation as between individuals

Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units, ££•
cit., p. 52.
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and economic groups it would bring the double result of a
reduced tax burden on the over-taxed and of peace of mind to
those who feel a sense of injustice in what seems to them a
tax system that does not conform as much as it should to fundamental principles of justice.
Taxation is largely a matter of expediency rather than
careful analysis.

If a new industry moves into the stat e,

or if our economic and social structure increases so that
additional revenue is nee ded to carry on the functions of
government, the question before the legislature is not one of
determining the tax which is best adapted to the economic organizati on, but one of dete rmining the most lucrative source
of revenue.

Often, too,

th~r~ al

effect of a tax cannot be

determined until it has been in operation for a period of
time.

It is only natural, therefore, that the dynamics of an

economic system should make a periodic adjus tment of taxes
necessary .

Maladjustments incident to economic changes must

be equitably adjusted, or else other industries will expand
at the expense of the over-taxed industry.
The natural gas problem.

An excellent example of tax

dissatisfaction is found in the fuel industries of Utah.

Coal

producers claim that the gas company is being given preferential
tax treatment.

In each of the last six r e gular sessions of

the Utah Legislature, an act providing for additional taxes
on natural gas has been introduced.

Both sides have entered

vigorously into the controversy, but as yet the plan of the
coal people has not received legislative approval.

But before
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analyzing the tax of each to determine whether or not uniformity exists, perhaps we should outline a background for
our analysis.
Background of the problem.

The factors which have led

to a decline in demand for coal have been discussed.

Studies

of coal markets and of coal consumption disclose that increased
efficiencies in coal utilization for power and heating purposes,
development of water power, and the displacement of coal by
fuel oil and natural gas have each taken a heavy toll from the
Utah coal market.
Scientific advancement in the utilization of coal is
commendable because it increases efficiency and conserves a
valuable natural resource.

Furthermore, it has strengthened

the position of coal in competing with substitute fuels.

Free

competition between water power, coal, and other fuels in areas
where each abound, are essential to progress and the impDovement of economic welfare.

But, where the market for any of

these energy sources is arbitrarily extended into the market
territory of another because of preferential taxes or freedom from regulatory control, economic peril overtakes the invaded industry unless regulatory measures are adopted which
will maintain parity in competition.
Direct competition of gas.

Whether or not gas sales in

Utah are a result of preferential treatment is a subject of
vigorous controversy.

In the most densely populated areas of

Utah natural gas is available.

This product is piped from

producing fields in Colorado, Wyoming, and Daggett County,
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Utah.

Since 1929, when natural gas was first introduced into

Utah, the utility has made phenomental growth.4

As a result,

Utah coal production has been sapped to an alarming extent.
In 1940, natural gas displaced 666,765 tons of coa1. 5

This

quantity amounted to nearly 20 percent of the total coal output of that year.

Although the gas company refers to this

reduction in coal sales as a "negligible displacement," the
sale of this quantity of coal would have increased the gross
operating income by more than $1,800,000. 6 This would have
been a highly significant increase in coal revenue in view of
the fact that the coal industry already had enough capital
equipment available to produce this additional quantity.

Even

a slight increase in revenue is significant in a decreasing
costs industry.
This displacement means more than a loss to the mines
of much needed revenue; it means an employment loss of more
than 110,000 man-days of labor for the year.7

Therefore,

approximately 630 mine laborers who had depended upon the
coal companies for the prosperity and security of themselves
and their families were displaced by gas pipes and gas labor.
But when all the labor elements incident to coal production,
distribution, and consumption, including mining, transportation, retail handling, firing, ash disposal, etc. are considered, the man-days of labor amount to approximately 600,000.
4
5
6
7

Table 3, p. 30.
Assuming 22,073 cubic feet of gas as equivalent to one
ton of coal.
Coal valued at $2.70 per ton at the mine.
Utah mines operated an average of 175 days in 1940.
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This means a total labor displacement of approximately 3,500
men.8

To offset this unemployment trend, the gas company

employed 336 men in 1940.9

On this basis it seems safe to

conclude that unemployment has increased as coal sales have
decreased due to gas displacement.
Railroad companies, also, surfered an irrecoverable loss.
In 1940, the coal production decline resulting from the gas
invasion reduced railroad traffic by 14,817 cars or 45 tons
each, or 212 trains of 70 cars each.

Moreover, coal truckers,

retail dealers, and others who depended on the coal industry
for a livelihood were affected by the 20-percent displacement
of coal.

Indeed, the effects of the expansion of the gas

utility have been farreaching and revolutionary.
Labor taxes.

There are other aspects of the problem that

should be discussed.
ers in the state.

Coal mines are among the largest employ-

This means large payrolls.

The industry

is regulated by the federal government regarding wages, prices,
and company policies.

No higher wages are paid in Utah than

are paid by this industry, but wage costs are not the only
labor costs of a modern business.

Compensation and social

security taxes are also significant costs.

They rest most

heavily on those industries which employ the most labor.

Since

the labor cost of producing a ton of coal is almost three times
as high as the labor cost of producing an equivalent volume
8
9

A common phrase in coal advertising is 11 A ton of coal
purchased employs a man a day. "
.Mountain Fuel Supply Company, ..2E.• cit., p. 11.

- 83 -

of gas, it seems to follow that these labor taxes are almost
three times as burdensome to the coal industry as they are
to their gas competitors.

However, there is one other point

to consider before coming to a conclusion.

It may be that

the gas company is indirectly employing more labor and paying more labor taxes in the form of prices on their new capital equipment than is the coal industry.

Every foot of pipe

is a product of labor and bears a wage cost and a tax cost.
Although this is an indirect form of employment, it is equally
significant in an economic analysis.
Recent statements of the Mountain Fuel Supply Company
indicate that approximately $1,000,000 is being invested in
capital expansion each year.

In 1938, this increase amounted

to $1,440,000, and in 1939, to $564,000.10

The coal industry,

likewise, invests heavily in fixed capital.

The rapid mech-

anization and coal preparation program has resulted in an expenditure of more than $1,000,000 per year.ll
coal industry and the gas

u~ility

'l'herefore, the

are about even in

~heir

expenditures for indirect labor and labor taxes. The coal industry, however, spreads this indirect cost over its larger
fuel production, with the result that the load is less burdenscm~ p~r

ton.

It is doubtful that the difference which the

gas company pays would equal the direct costs of labor and
labor taxes which the coal producers bear, however.
Rate determination.
10
11

The type of competition that natural

Statement of the Mountain Fuel Supply Company.
Statement of the Utah Coal Operators Association.
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gas offers is significant.
ed.

No yardstick of values is employ-

The rate-making formula of the gas company is simply one

of charging the domestic consumer as high a rate as possible,
and charging industrial concerns whatever rate is necessary
to displace coal.

The gas companies vociferously deny this

charge, but its truth is quite well established.

Authoritiesl2

have recognized this unfair competition and have loudly condemned it.

hven company officers on occasions have referred

to the industrial consumption of gas as merely a stop-gap.
On this point, Floyd

c.

Brownl3 made the following comment:

It is a fUndamental principle that a long distance
transmission line must depend on domestic business for
its base load. The economics involved prevent natural
gas from competing with cheap power plant and bOiler
coal, except for short intervals during the period of
developing and connecting the domestic markets.
It is authoritatively stated that about 4i cents per
thousand cubic feet is paid leaseholders and others for gas
at the point of production.

The cost of gathering this gas

is another one and a half cents, making the total field cost
about six cents.

The cost of pipe line transportation has

been shown to be three cents per 100 miles.

Since the length

of the transmission line from the gas fields to . Salt Lake City
is 531 miles,l4 we have a transportation cost of approximately
16 cents.

This, plus the field gathering cost of six cents

givea a total of 22 cents per thousand cubic feet delivered
12
13
14

Eavenson, Coal Through the Ages, p. 89.
Vice President and General lanager of the Natural Gas
and Pipe Line Company of Am~rica, Chicago.
Report of the Utah Public Service Commission, 1940 p. 134.
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in Salt Lake City.l5
Thes~

are average figures and may not accurately re-

flect costs in Utah.
could be too high.

Transportation costs, especially,
The gas sources tapped for Utah consump-

tion have more pressure than gas producing wells in most
areas.

Rather than have to pump the gas to Utah markets,

the Mountain Fuel Supply Company has to reduce the pressure
before it reaches the consumer.

But even if this results in

a considerable saving, and even if other costs are also less
than the above averages, it still seems logical to conclude
that much gas is being "dumped" onto the Utah market at less
than the actual costs of production.
In 1938 the average price that the natural gas utility
charged consumers in Utah for each thousand cubic feet of
natural gas are as follows: domestic, 64.6 cents; commercial,
35.7 cents; and industrial, 11.1 cents.l6
also averages.

These figures are

In reality, almost half of the gas sold in

Utah was sold at the rate of 8.1 cents per thousand cubic
feet. 17 This is little more than th~ cost of the gas at the
division point.

The low industrial price of gas is a result

of a large available supply of gas in the

fi~ld,

and a planned

attempt to capture much of the market from other fuels.

If

gas is reduced to a coal-equivalent basis, table 11 shows the
per-ton prices of natural gas and coke oven gas.
15 These data are from a report prepared by the Illinois Reciprocal Trade Association, The Facts About Natural Gas in
Illinois.
----- -16 Min~rals Yearbook, 1940.
17 Testimony of B. P. Manley before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
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Table 11.

Gas sales, revenue, and value for each volume of
gas equivalent to one ton of coal, 1938-1939;
-=------~19~3~8~~~~-=-=------~1~9~3~9----~~-: Gas
:Value : Gas :
:Value
:sales
Total
per :sales : Total
per
:m.c.f.: revenue
ton* :m.c.f.: revenue
ton*

Gas

Natural
:
Industrial: 9,512:$1,150,758:$ 2.67:10,902:$1,309,811:$ 2.65
Pomestic
2,088: 1,381,576: 14.60: 2,199: 1,464,284: 14.69
Artificial :
•
283:
37,319: 5.09
Industrial:
270:
36,125: 5.17:
Domestic :
174:
80,457: 17.85:
186:
86,073: 17.85

.
.
.
.
.
:12,044:$2,648,916:
.
.•
.•
•

Total

.•

.•

.•

:13,570:$2,897,487:
••

*Fuel equivalent basis.
Source: Statement of Mountain Fuel Supply Company
This table shows that the domestic consumers who used
approximately 17 percent of the natural gas sold in Utah
actually pay more than half the revenue to the gas company.
Why the domestic consumer should pay 5! times as much for a
given volume of gas as does the industrial consumer has no
explanation other than the fact that the company can get that
much more.

True, the industrial concerns buy more gas, but

the cost per unit has no relation to the price of industrial
fuel.

In setting these prices the company arbitrarily fixes

them low enough to win_a customer.
Coal companies can offer no such differentials, however
desirous they may be of retaining their customers.

One of

the basic reasons which prevent the coal operators from cutting the price of coal to a ridiculously low figure is the
cost of transportation.

Since more than half of the retail
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price of coal is a transportation coat, coal companies are
effectively prevented from cutting below this figure; and
operations could not continue long if the companies did not
at least cover their variable costs.

This includes labor

and supplies, which are the two major costs in coal extraction.
The gas company owns its own transportation facilities.
Hence, it is not imperative that transmission costs be collected on each cubic foot of gas.
Another important reason why coal companies cannot cut
prices so freely as can their gas competitors is the fact that
they are regulated by the federal government.

Prices are

fixed, and broad discriminations are not permitted.

Gas has

no such check.
Pertinence

!£ ~!!!

analysis.

The gas industry has

created no new market, no new demand for fuel, has brought
not a single industry to Utah.

It has grown, and grows, only

as it has taken, and takes, a market from other fuel.

It

has taken jobs from men and traffic from the railroads.
With the decreased prosperity, earning ability, and even abandonment of mines, resulting from loss of markets, the taxable
values of coal mines and of coal mining communities have been
reduced.

Likewise, tax revenues on coal yards and the equip-

ment used in the transportation and delivery of coal have
declined.
Furthermore, the gas company employs fewer men than have
been displaced in the coal fields.

They fail to make up this
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deficit in indirect employment in the form of capital equipment.

Hence, they pay less wages and less labor taxes.

Moreover, they employ no yardstick of values and therefore
offer a vicious type of competition to other fuels.

The gas

utility is unregulated in its competitive activities.

All

of these charges are justified, but, all of them together do
not indict the general property tax on grounds of discrimination.

Coal producers should me e t the issue squarely in chal-

lenging the uniformity of fuel taxes.

The economic effect of

coal displacement on labor, railroads, communities, and the
state is one thing; the injustice of a tax is quite another.
The arguments in proof of each are not interchangeable.
There is no question but that the coal industry has suffered from the competition of gas.

It is equally obvious that

the economic effects of this revolutionary invasion has
iously

affect~d

other activities.

for a claim of tax inequality.

s~r

But still this is no basis

It might suggest that the un-

regulated condition of the gas utility gives natural gas a
competitive advantage.

Or, it might suggest that the gas.

company with its streamlined and efficient organization is much
more capable of competing in the market than the coal industry
with many production units and scores of distributors.
presentage emphasizes

effici~ncy.

has not awakened to this fact.

The

Perhaps the coal industry

And, perhaps wasteful competi-

tive practices in the past, and to a certain extent even now,
have placed the coal industry in a serious economic condition.
The federal government has recognized this state of dis-
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organization, but it is questionable whether it has helped
alleviate the distress.

It may even follow that the price-

fixing program has made matters worse.

The futility of fix-

ing the price of one product without exercising similar control over related products and substitutes has been demonstrat~d

many times .

The federal government is working on

the assumption that a slight ri s e in the price of coal at
the mine would mean higher wages for labor and profits for
the operators.

But the practical effect of the program may

be turning purchasers to substitute fuels and making the
position of the mines even more precarious.

A slight increase

in the price of a commodity with a relatively elastic demand
results in an important decline in revenue.

Both individ-

uals and corporations a r e constantly comparing costs of one
type of fuel as against another.

Those t o whom natural gas

is accessible will shift from coal if business costs are
thereby reduced.
From this analysis we might suggest two reasons why gas
sales have increased so rapidly in Utah: (l) the inefficiency
of coal production and distribution, and (2) the absence of
regulatory control over the practices of the gas utility .
These two factors reduce the ability of coal to compete.
the two, the first seems much more important.

Of

It may be that

tax inequality is a third factor, but it is doubtful that uniform tax treatment would do as much for the competitive position
of coal mines as would the elimination of fully half the production units and half the retail dealers.

Since this sug-
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gestion is impractical under our present system, perhaps a
discussion on the question o£ taxation should be made in an
e£fort to determine the relative tax position of each company.
Tests of tax uniformity.

All of the evils o£ the coal

industry connot be attributed to tax inequalities.

But,

coming back to a point we made in the beginning, tax inequalities may seriously handicap the industry which is being given
discriminatory treatment.

Just because we cannot agre e with

the coal operators that lack of tax uniformity is the chief
reason for their loss of markets does not mean that we do not
attach

importan~e

to the problem.

In table 12 taxes paid by the gas company are presented
for the years 1929 to 1940, together with the tax per equivalent ton of coal.
Table 12.

Total property taxes and taxes per equivalent ton
of coal paid by the gas industry in the State of
Utah, 1929 to 1940.

.

:Gas sales in thousands:
Tax per
of cubic feet
: EquivaGeneral :equivlt.
Year
Natural
:Coke oven:lent tons: property :ton of
gas
gas
of coal
taxes
• coal
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

.

.

Source:

394,198
3,645,820
4,774,234
5,531,884
5,799,670
6,589,076
8,614,014
10,451,958
12,340,830
11,600,132
13,100,300
14,717,511

17,858
. 165,171
.
220,419
258,409 .
270,537 .
305,629

.

.• $

.
159,374
300,951
300,792
274,877
357,292
387,741
427,344
443,813
46 9,183
505,111

.

.

399,501
483,556
570,155
537,025
605,644 ••
679,841

70,783
119,876
108,501
107,953
109,590
112,678
138,389
126,410
156,579
183,278
210,627
213,099

.

72.58t
49.22
41.78
40.51
36.87
34.64
26.14
27.46
34.13
35.49
31.96

Mountain Fuel Supply Company, ·~Message of Vital
;im:Qortance .iQ. every ~ of Coal ..Q.!.: Gas . in Utah.

Table 13 shows the taxes paid by the coal industry in
the State of Utah for the years 1925 to 1940.
Table 13.
Year

Total general property tax and taxes per ton of coal
mined for the Utah coal industry, 1925 to 1940.
General propProduction
Tax per ton
in tons
in cents
erty taxes

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
Source:

$389,039
381,147
383,290
374,764
392,193
414,058
418,948
404,648
373,455
386,292
370,049
283,940
287,400
271,727
262,663
242,117

4,690,342
4,373,793
4,781,480
4,842,544
5,160,521
4,257,541
3,350,044
2,852,127
2,674,986
2,406,183
2,946,918
3,246,565
3,809,476
2,946,951
3,340,000
3,500,000

8.29
8.71
8.02
7.74
7.59
9.73
12.51
14.19
13.96
16.05
12.56
8.75
7.54
9.22
7.86
6.92

Mountain Fuel Supply Company, A Message of Vital
Importance ~ EVery ~ £f. Coa'I £!: Gas inut8h.

Table 14 is a combination of the data presented in the
two previous tables.

By combining this information into

parallel columns we get some conception of tax per ton of
coal and per equivalent ton of gas for the combined coal
companies and for the gas company of Utah.

An inspection of the last two columns in table 14 shows
that from the standpoint of general property taxes alone,
when compared on a tonnage basis, gas is carrying approximately four and one-half times the burden of taxation that
coal carries.

Since these data were compiled by the gas com-
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Table 14.
:
Year
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

A comparison of the taxation of coal and gas in
Utah, 1929 to 1940.

Assessed valuation
Coal
:
Gas

Gen. prop. taxes
Coal
Gas

.
.
.
.
: $15,208,759: $ 2,050,430 : $392,193: $
15,292,030:
14,711,203:
14,409,273:
12,537,856:
12,170,724:
12,921,555:
10,874,022:
10,424,287:
9,568,248:
8,438,025:
7,993 ,519:

Source:

3,912,971
3,458,607
3,473,985
3,413,615
3,412,099
4,183,825
4,182,484
4,890,766
5,695,293
5,988,962
6,109,078

414,058:
418;948:
404,648:
373,455:
386,292:
370,049:
283,940:
287,400:
271,727:
262,663:
242,117:

70,783
119,876
108,501
107,953
109,590
112,678
138,389
126,410
156,579
183,278
210,627
213,099

Tax per ton
Coal : Gas
:
:
:
:

:

••

7.59p
9.73:
12.51:
14.19:
13.96:
16.05:
12.56:
8.75:
7.54:
9.22:
7.86:
6 .92:

72.58t
49.22
41.78
40.51
36.87
34.64
26.14
27.46
34.13
35.49
31.96

Mountain Fuel Supply Company, A Message of Vital
Importance to Every user of Coal .£.!: Gas 'Iii Utah.

pany, it was well that the companies carried their arguments
no further.

The figures are accurate, but the impression they

leave with the r e ader is far from realistic.
The general property tax on gas is more inclusive than the
tax on coal.

It includes a tax on the productive equipment

at the well, on the transmission equipment, and on the entire
distribution system.

All of the property taxes incident to

production and distribution of gas are added up, and the tax
coat per equivalent ton of coal was 31.96 cents in 1940.
The data for coal are not so inclusive.

It cannot be

assumed that coal is transported tax free, becaus e railroads
pay heavy property taxes also, and these taxes come out of
the rates charged for transporting coal and other products.
One of the most important sources of railroad r evenue i s the
coal traffic.

It seems logical to conclude, therefore, that
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the railroads add an important tax cost to the coal purchased
by the consumers.

Retail and wholesale agencies each pay

heavy property taxes on their property and equipment.

Theo-

retically, at least, distributors recoup these expenditures
out of coal sales.

The addition of transportation and dis-

tribution tax costs to the production tax cos ts would raise
the total tax per ton of coal considerably above the 6.92 cents
of 1940.
Unfortunately, we have no reliable information on the total
tax cost of producing and marketing Utah coal.

Calculations

made by the Utah Coal Operators• Association for the year 1936
placed the total tax at $ 2,035,000.18

This is an enormous

increase in taxes over $283,940 paid by the mines in 1936.
But if we assume that the operators correctly calculated all
the tax costs of 1936, we discover that the total cost for taxes
per ton of coal amounted to approximately 31.90 cents per ton.l9
This figure is more than five cents higher than the tax per
equivalent ton of gas in 1936.

However, no emphasis can be

placed upon this analysis for two reasons: {1) the accuracy of
the data has not been verified, and {2) data for a single year
do not present any basis for generalizations.

It does seem

evident, though, that taxes on distribution would exceed in
amount the taxes on mining equipment and land.
On this point, one other fact should be recognized: that
is, 45 percent of the coal which Utah produces is sold in other
18
19

From the fil es of Senator George M. Miller of Carbon County.
$1,035,000 divided by 3,246,565 tons.
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states.

The taxes on the distribution of Utah coal would

not include those taxes paid on transportation and retailing
outside the state of Utah.

By spreading the distribution

costs in Utah over only that percentage of Utah coal that is
consumed in the state, the tax per ton is raised somewhat.
It must be said of gas, also, that the company in 1940
actually paid $56,627.68 in property taxes in Colorado and
Wyoming, and $19,639.00 as royalties to the federal government.20

These taxes have not been taken into consideration

because nearly 230 million cubic feet of gas were sold to
customers in Wyoming, and because we have not taken into
account the royalties on Utah coal, which would be many times
greater than the gas royalties.

It may be that Wyoming con-

sumers do not pay all of the tax which Colorado and Wyoming
ass~ssed

against the gas company.

In that case, some of these

taxes are probably shifted to the Utah consumers.

We are not

prepared to answer this question.
If we compare the property tax in cents per dollar of
gross income for 1938 and 1939 for tons of coal and tne gas
~quivalont, w~

These

get the following

r~lationship:

1938
Coal. • • • • • ~
Gas • • • • • • 6.91

1939
'3':"!S
7.24

do

ov~r~axa~ion

figur~s

compared with gas.

no~

show any

of coal as

However, they cover only a short period,

and they do not take into consideration other taxes that are
subs~quently

20

added to coal.

Mountain Fuel Supply

But compared on a dollar of gross

Company,~·

cit., pp. 9 and 11.
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revenue basis, the other taxes should not seriously change
the relationship, since the coal also increases in value as
it moves nearer the market.
Deductions.

In view of our analysis, which has by no

means been complete or exhaustive, we present the following
deductions:
(1) That gas is not a tax-free fuel even though no
assessment is made directly against the product.
(2) That the property tax appears to be just as burdensome to the gas utility as it is to coal companies.
(3) That compensation and social security taxes rest
more heavily on coal than on gas.
(4) That natural gas is sold for industrial purposes
at a price which coal producers cannot meet.
(5) That natural gas has reduced employment in Utah,
and possibly total employment.
(6) That the coal industry has suffered from loss of
markets to gas.
(7) That the present plight of the Utah coal industry
is not "mainly" due to the gas invasion.
(8) That the increased tax on gas, for which the coal
industry has been clamoring, may be justified from the standpoint of regulation, but not on the basis of uniformity.
There is a need for a more complete analysis on this
problem.

Each industry pays many taxes in addition to the

general property tax.
fully.

These, also, should be studied care-

Furthermore, it seems that very little attention has
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been given to the problem determining the tax burden of a
given product; and yet, to

mak~

intelligent comparisons

between the tax burden of two competing products, such as
gas and coal, it is important to know just how much is added
to the tax cost of coal by each distributive agency.

Other-

wise, comparable data are not available to compare uniformity.
Analyses, therefore, often merely conjecture and fail to solve
problems.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the Utah coal industry is in a distressed
economic condition, there seems to be no justirication ror
assuming that the property tax is at fault.

The coal pro-

ducers have not been singled out for a special tax burden.
Their special formula of assessment has been flexible enough
to be adjusted to the changed economic conditions which have
threatened the industry .

With the exception of a few depres-

sion years when the average tax per ton of coal mined almost
doubled, the tax burden on coal mines has been reasonably
uniform.
The fact that taxes on coal deposits and mining equipment have been adjustable is highly significant in view of
the revolutionary changes which have taken place in the industry.

The ad valorem procedure of taxing coal mines was

formulated in 1919, one of the last years of a rising production trend.

Carefully as the formula was worked out, it

was still calculated largely in terms of a continuous prosperity for the coal industry .

But the v ery opposite

occur~ed.

Production declined, leaving the mines tremendously overcapitalized.

Had the tax procedure

prov~d

too rigid to

modifivd, disastrous effects might have resulted.

b~

The actual

tax per ton of coal mined in 1940 was as low as for any year
since 1921, although the economic changes which have upset the
equilibrium of coal production undoubtedly have forced the
companies to assume more of the incidence of their tax.
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The taxing procedure has also had other good effects.
Ad valorem taxes on natural resources are frequently criticized on the ground that they force production to offset the
tax load, thus resulting in wasteful exploitation.

Although

this is a valid criticism (and we are unprepared to say how
much practical effect this tendency has had in Utah), it does
app~ar

that certain regulatory aspects of

th~

tax

count~ract

over-production tendencies to a large extent.
There is much

evidenc~

to sustain the conclusion that

tax-burden uniformity in Utah is more of an ideal than a reality, but still we can find no evidence to warrant the conclusion that coal operators are paying more in taxes than their
competitors on leased lands pay in royalties.

Furthermore,

no obvious discrimination against coal in comparing the property tax on coal with that of gas was discoverable.

While

it is a fact that natural gas has reduced the demand for coal,
displaced mine employees, reduced railroad

rev~nue,

and threat-

ened the prosperity of many Utah communities, there seem to

b~

no grounds for asserting that gas has made these gains because
of preferential tax treatment.
To sum up:

The plight of the coal industry appears to be

a function of over-development and over-capitalization, although fUel efficiencies and displacement by other fuels has
complicated the problem.

Government insistence during the

World War did result in some expansion, but with an expanding
production trend and high coal prices it is doubtful that enterprisers needed much urging.

In any case, the expansion in
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mining facilities which continued right up to the depression
can hardly be attributed to governmental insistence.

Real-

istically speaking, the over-capacity is due mainly to unjustified optimism on the part of mining companies and the
abundance of easily developed coal resources.
The problem of excess productive capacity is a disturbing factor.

Four mines could easily produce all the coal

that is necessary to supply the market for Utah coal.

But,

instead of only four mines, there are more than 90 mines
equipped for operations in Utah.

Such a set-up naturally leads

to cut-throat competition with the result that the whole industry suffers.

In correcting this menace, some headway is

being made through trade associations and federal regulation.
Theoretically, the solution to this problem would be to close
down all the mines that are not profitable and allow only a
few of the more efficient operators to supply the entire
market.

With a well-organized group of efficient producers,

coal could meet the challenge of gas and other substitutes;
and the competition between gas, oil, electricity, and coal
would still protect the consumer against excessive prices.
The present loose and inefficient organization of the coal
companies, however, cannot hope to compete with the streamlined monopolistic organization of the gas company.
Reducing the coal industry to a compact group of efficient mines is impossible under a system of free competition.

An individual has the constitutional right to engage in any
occupation he desires so long as he does not infringe on the
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property rights and lives of other people.
In view of the fact that the coal problem is national
in scope, there is little possibility that any solution can
be worked out for Utah alone.

It is doubtful that any real

soluuion will be forthcoming until new uses are discovered
for the product.

In the meantime the industry will have its

scapegoats: excessive taxes, undertaxed competitors, and many
others.

At present, however, there seems to be no evidence

of either an excessive tax burden or tax discrimination.

The

coal industry, freed from all taxes would still be hobbled by
its over-capacity and inefficiency.
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SUMMARY

1.

It is difficult to fit mine taxation into any sys-

tem of general business taxation.

Therefore, most states with

mineral wealth have adopted special procedures for taxing
mining properties.
2.

Utah adopted a special ad valorem assessment for-

mula for taxing coal mines in 1919.
3.

r:-

Assessing coal deposits in a technical process.

Since coal is hidden from sight, it is difficult to measure
its accessible tonnage and quality.
4.

The value of coal in Utah is based on an extensive

geological survey.

More than 100 billion tons of Utah coal

were measured and mapped before any assessment values were
worked out.
5.

Determining ton-values after the geological survey

was completed also was a technical problem.

Much economic

data were assembled and weighted in ascertaining fair tonvalues.

SUch problems as calculating the average tonnage that

it would be practical to extract, determining deferred values,
and equalizing tax burdens were exceedingly complicated.
6.

Coal operators on leased land pay a ten-cent royalty

to the federal government on each ton of extracted coal.

It

was -originally intended that the tax on coal mines should be
equally burdensome.
?.

All coal lands in Utah were divided into 40-acre

tracts and classified according to the theory that the most
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accessible coal would be mined first.

Those divisions which

were being operated or were adjacent to an operating mine or
railroad were assigned the highest ton-values.
8.

The fact that the procedure would need to be ad-

justed and modified to meet unforeseen changes was recognized
by those who formulated the plan.
9.

In addition to an assessment on coal deposits, equip-

ment and improvements are also assessed on an ad valorem basis.
About 40 percent of coal mine taxes are based on this type of
property.
10.

The equilibrium of coal production was upset shortly

after 1919.

Industrial expansion outran actual demand.

This

factor, together with fuel efficiencies and loss of markets
to competitive fuels, left the coal industry in a precarious
economic condition.
11.

Over-expansion was mainly due to over-optimism, the

abundance of coal, the ease of development, seasonal demand,
World War demand, and promotional schemes.
12.

The coal industry now has many more mines and much

more equipment than is ever used.

Since coal deposits and

equipment are assessable whether they are productive or idle,
it is obvious that the tax cost per ton of coal mined is
higher than it would be if mines and equipment were limited
to that which is productive.
13.

Utah mines are trying to meet competition through

mechanizing the extraction and preparation processes, .While
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this program increases efficiency, it also enlarges the tax base.
14.

The tax burden does not rest uniformly on all coal com-

panies.

Differences in burden are largely a result of the vari-

ous policies of individual companies with respect to land reserves and capitalization.
15.

More important than the variations in the tax burden,

are the variations in the average burden of all coal mines in
different years.

While the former differentials are mainly a

result of company policies, the latter are a function of the
taxing procedure.
16.

Most complaints against the method of taxing coal mines

are based on company differences rather than on fundamental
injustices.
17.

In only five depression years has the average tax bur-

den per ton of coal mined exceeded the royalty of ten cents
per ton.
18.

The fact that the direct burden of the tax has been

held within reasonable bounds despite the decline in production to less than half that of 1920 can be attributed to a
large extent to the reduction in assessment values in 1933 and
1936.
19.

Even in the depression years it is doubtful that the

ad valorem tax burden on coal mines was heavier than those
borne by other classes of property that were assessed on the
same basis.
20.

Although economic changes have disrupted the in-

dustry, it seems that the ad valorem system has flexibility
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enough to meet these changes.
21.

The direct tax burden in 1940 was less per ton of

coal mined than in any year since 1920.

However, the demand

for coal has become more elastic as a result of fuel efficiencies and fuel substitutes.

Over-capitalization and con-

tinued mechanization have transformed coal production into a
decreasing-cost industry.

Since the capital is fixed and

specialized, it is more immobile than the hand tools of the
past.

All of these factors have forced the industry to as-

sume more of the incidence of their tax.
22.

Ad valorem taxes on natural resources have been

criticized on the ground that they force production to offset the tax load.
23.

Requiring the highest rate of taxation on those

40-acre tracts which have an opening to the coal seam effectively prevents the opening of
24.

m~nes

on all outcrops.

Conservation is also encouraged in that Utah taxes

only 63 percent of the actual coal in each deposit.
percent is considered a legitimate waste.

The 37

This percentage

has some practical effect in that companies mine clean in an
effort to recover as much tax-free coal as possible.

Produc-

tion taxes provide no such incentive.
25.

Monopolistic control of land is prevented in that

coal deposits are taxed whether they are being mined

~r

not.

Since current production must carry the tax burden of reserve
land as well as productive land, reserve land must be reasonable to prevent tax costs from becoming exhorbitant.
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26.

Coal mine taxes have been easy to collect and are a

dependable source of revenue.
27.

While ad valorem assessments on all classes of

property have been a stable source of revenue for the state,
taxes based on net proceeds have fluctuated violently.

This

is one important example of unequal treatment.
28.

The problem of equating taxes is important in view

of the fact that inequalities may seriously handicap the industry that is being given discriminatory treatment, and may
unwittingly sponsor the activities of a competitor.
29.

Although there is definite evidence that the gas in-

dustry in Utah has displaced coal, labor, and railroad traffic,
and thereby has seriously affected the economic condition of many
Utah communities, these arguments are not prima facie evidence
that gas is being given preferential tax treatment.
30.

Comparisons of taxes per ton of coal and per equiv-

alent ton of gas show no evidence of discrimination against coal.
31.

Likewise, comparisons between gas and coal on the

basis of tax cents per dollar of gross income reveal no serious inequalities.
32.

Increased taxes on gas may be justified from the

standpoint of regulation, but not on the basis of uniformity.
33.

In view of this analysis, there is no evidence that

coal taxes are either excessive or discriminatory.
34.

The basic causes of the economic plight of the mines

are not taxes, but over-capacity and inefficiency.

These pro-

blems are common to the coal industries in all localities.
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Appendix A.

Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

••

.••
•

.••
•
••
.••
•

:

••
••

••
••

.••
•
••
:

••
••
••

..
•
••

:

.•
••

.••
•
•
•.
•

Production and a five-year average of production in thousands of tons for Utah coal mines,
1900 to 1940

Production
1,234
1,382
1,641
1,782
1,563
1,603
1,839
1,968
1,845
2,322
2,526
2,513
2,808
3,255
3,103
3,109
3,567
4,125
5;137
4;631
6,005
4;079
4,992
4,720
4,488
4,690
4,374
4,781
4,843
5,161
4,258
3,350
2,851
2,675
2,406
2,947
3,247
3,810
2, ,908
3,340
3,524

5-year total
••
••
••
••

••

.•••
••
••
••
••
••
••

••
••

:

..
.••
.•
J

••
••

..•
•

7,602
7,971
8,428
8,755
8,818
9,577
10,500
11,174
12,014
13,424
14,205
14,'788
15,842
17,159
19,041
20,569
23,465
23,977
24,844
24,427
22,969
23,264
23,053
23,176
23,849
23,624
23,417
22,393
20,464
18,296
15,541
14,230
14,127
15,085
15,318
16,252
16,829

••
••

.•
••

.•
.•••
.•••
•
.•
.
.
••
.•••
••
••
••
••

.•

••
••
••
••
•
••
•
••
••

.
.

Source: Minerals Yearbooks 1934 to 1940

5-year average

1,520
1,594
1,686
1, 764
1,751
1,915
2,100
2,235
2,403
2,685
2,841
2,958
3,168
3,432
3, 808
4,114
4,693
4,795
4,969
4,885
4,857
4,594
4,653
4,611
4,635
4,7'70
4,683
4,479
4,093
3,659
3,108
2,846
2,825
3,017
3,062
3,250
3,366
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Average monthly production and monthly indices
of production for Utah and the United States,
1935 to 1940
u~::fi
Uii!ted States
:Average output:
:Average output:
:in thousands :Index of : in thousands : Index of
•• of tons
:production:
or tons
:production

Appendix B.

Month
Average

263

100

37,378

100

January

385

145

41,438

111

February

380

143

42,661

114

March

261

98

48,935

131

April

168

63

32,213

86

May

137

52

30,271

81

June

124

47

31,988

86

July

128

48

32,184

86

August

183

69

34,187

91

September

278

105

39,428

105

October

358

135

41,110

110

.November

372

140

36,699

98

December

401

151

37,417

100

Source:

Minerals Yearbooks, 1936 to 1940
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Appendix C. Excess capacity of Utah coal mines in thousands
of tons and p erceFZi 1915 to 1940
••
:*Avg. : Avg. a
ltimeiOapaolty:
:
:number : da1lyacapaoity: based : Percent of
:*Total :of days :outputr based • on a
excess
Year
output: mines • in r on a
260capacitt
oper- , : thou-:308-day
•
day
: "2 0•
a ted
sands: ;,y:ear
;,y:ear
da;,y:
• Full
•
•
•
•
25.9
1915 •• 3,109:
208 •• 15.0 •• 4,620 •• 3,916 •• 48.6
14.4
1916 • 3,567:
228 • 15.7 • 4,836 •• 4,082 •• 35.6
18.5
18.8 •• 5,790 •• 4,888 • 40.4
1917 •• 4,125:
219
.7
1918 •• 5,137:
258 •• 19.9 •• 6,129 •• 5,1%t •• 19.3 ••
1919 •• 4,631:
247 •• 18.8 •• 5,790 • 14:,886 • 25.0 • 5.5
3.0
1920 • 6,005:
252 • 23.8 •• 7,330 •• 6,186 : 22.1
1921 • 4,079:
151 •• 27.0 • 8,316 •• 7,020 :103.9 : 72.1
6,320 • 52.2 : 27.6
1922 •• 4,992:
204 • 24.5 • 7,546
9,086 •• '2,6'lQ
160 •• 29.5
92.5 :· 62.5
1923 • 4,720:
1924 •• 4,488:
182 •• 24.7 •• 7,608 •• 6,42G
69.5 • 43.1
72 .1 •• 45.2
1925 •• 4,690:
179 •• 26.2 •• 8,070 : 6,812
186 •• 23.5 •• 7,238 •• 6,ll0
65.5 • 39.7
1926
4,374:
5,9SI
47.5 •• 24.5
209 •• 22 .9 •• 7,05;3
1927 •• 4,781:
6,604
36.4
61.5
1928 •• 4,84:3:
191 •• 25.4 • 7,823
6,370
46.2 • 23.4
1929 •• 5,161:
211 • 24.5 •• 7,546
6,601
55.1
168 • 25.4 • 7,823
83.7
1930
4,258:
5,8~6 =106.9 •• 75.4
1931
148 • 22.6 •• 6,961
3,350:
4,2lb2 •• 75.0 •• 47.7
176 •• 16.2 •• 4,990
1932
2,852:
3,952
47.7
•• 75.0
1933
176 •• 15.2 •• 4,682
2,675:
3,666
1934
171 •• 14.1 • 4,343
•• 80.5 • 52.4
2,406:
4,192 •• 64.1 • 42.2
1935
188 •• 15.7 •• 4,836
2,947:
4,466
186 •• 17.1 •• 5~ 2 67
•• 62.2 •• 36.9
1936 •• 3, 247:
•
5,269
•• 63.4 •• 37.8
189 •• 20.2 • 6, 222
1937 •• 3,810:
1,862 •• 98.1 •• 73.1
156 •• 18.7 •• 5,760
1938 • 2,908:
5,200
167 •• 20.0 •• 6,160 · :
•• 84.4 •• 55.7
1939 •• 3,340:
5,226
1940 • 3,524:
175 •• 20.1 •• 6,191 •
• 75.7 • 48.3

.
..
.

.

.

.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

...

.

.

...
.

.
.

..
.

..

.
.
..

.
.

.
.

.

.
.

.•
Total:l04 019: 4
••
••
.
4
001:
Avi• •
••

1

1

*source:

••

.

.

••

.
.•

.

••

.••

•
1 985 :545.5 :168.016 :141 1 955 •

.••

••

192 • 21.0 ••

6 1 462

••

••
••

51460 •• 64.3 • 39.0

Investigating Committee of Utah Governmental Units,
An Economic Stud;,y: of the Development of Utah's

Coal Resources, appendix
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Percentage of Btu equivalent contributed by the
mineral fuels and water power in the United
States 1 1899 to 1940
Water power
Gas
Oil
Anthracite Bituminous

Appendix D.
Year

Source:

4
5
8
9
11
9
22 .
19
21
21
20
23
24
27
25
26
29
28
29
28
30
32
31
32

72
68
70
70
69
69
60
61
57
60
60
53
53
51
49
45
45
45
45
47
46
40
42
42

20
22
16
14
12
13
8
10
11
8
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
8
7
6
5
6
6
6

1899
1909
1913
1918
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

2
2
3

2
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
7
8
7
9
10
9
10
9
10
10
11
11
10

3

4
5
5
5
6
5
5
8
7
7
9
11
10
9
10
9
9
11
10
10

Minerals Yearbooks, 1934 to 1940
Coal production, operating costs, and all mining
costs of Utah mines for the months of April to
December 1937 1 and the zear 1936
:Produc-:Per ton :Operat- :All min- f Mining
••
:Production: tion :operat- :ing cost:ing costs:costs
••
:index :ing costs: index :12er ton :index

Appendix E.

.••
.

A.ver!Se •
April
•
••
May
June
••
July
August
:
September:
October •
November :
December :
Avg. 1936:

.

Source:

226 1 286
131,597
111,862
145,641
178,634
235,543
330,061
375,768
338,752
388,702
259,501

••

.•••
••

:
••
••

.•
.•••

100
57
49
64
79
104
141
163
149
172
119

••
••

••
••

.•
••
••
••
••

:

1.33
1.47
1.60
1.47
1.40
1.33
1.26
1.28
1.29
1.23
1.25

••
••
••

•

100
111
120
111
105
100
95
96
97
92
94

:
••

:

••
••
••
••
••

••

2.18
2.71
2.90
2.58
2.39
2.16
1.98
1.98
2.04
2.02
2.01

••

••
••

••

••
••

••
••
••

Report ot the National Bituminous Coal Commission

100
124
133
118
110
99
91
91
94
93
92
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